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I. THE JINGLE RULE
The distribution of the proceeds of partnership and partners' estates
in bankruptcy has been strongly influenced by rules that evolved in
equity.' The governing principle has been the so-called "jingle rule":
"Firm estate to firm creditors, separate estate to separate creditors,
anything left over from either to go to the other."' The rule was em-
bodied in section 5g of the Bankruptcy Act, and the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws incorporated the rule in section 40 of the Uniform
Partnership Act,4 largely in deference to the provision for it in the
' See Shroder, Distribution of Assets of Bankrupt Partnerships and Partners, 18
HARV. L. REV. 495, 496-97 (1905).
' Professor MacLachlan attributed the jingle rule to Professor James Barr Ames. See
J. MACLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 355, at 424 & n.9 (1956). The
origins of the rule can be traced as far back as Ex parte Crowder, 2 Vern. 706, 23 Eng. Rep.
1064 (Ch. 1715), but the jingle rule apparently derived its greatest impetus from Lord Hard-
wicke. See J. STORY, PARTNERSHIP 579-80 (7th ed. 1881). The rule was well established in the
United States before the Supreme Court decided Amsinck v. Bean, 89 U.S. 395, 401 (1874).
The rule is sometimes referred to as the "dual priorities" rule. See Hecker, The Revised
Uniform Limited Partnership Act. Provisions Affecting the Relationship of the Firm and
Its Members to Third Parties, 27 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 15 (1978).
' Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, § 5g, 30 Stat. 544, 11 U.S.C. § 23(a) (1976) (repealed 1978).
This is the only time that citation to 11 U.S.C. will be made in this article when the intended
reference is to the Bankruptcy Act. The numbering of the sections of the Bankruptcy Act
differs from their numbers in 11 U.S.C. The numbering of the Bankruptcy Act, which cor-
responds to the original numbering in the legislation as enacted in the Statutes at Large, is
that generally used in cases and commentaries pertaining to bankruptcy.
Section 5g of the Bankruptcy Act stated that "[t]he net proceeds of the partnership
property shall be appropriated to the payment of the partnership debts and the net pro-
ceeds of the individual estate of each general partner to the payment of his individual
debts." The subdivision provided further that any surplus remaining from any general part-
ner's property shall be added to the partnership estate, and any surplus of the partnership
property shall be proportionately distributed among the partners' estates.
See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 40(h). Section 40(h) states that "[w]hen partnership
property and the individual properties of the partners are in possession of a court for
distribution, partnership creditors shall have priority on partnership property and separate
creditors on individual property, saving the rights of lien or secured creditors as
heretofore." The Uniform Partnership Act has been enacted by all states except Georgia
and Louisiana. See 6 U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 1982).
Other provisions of § 40 of the Uniform Partnership Act elaborate the jingle rule. Sec-
tion 40(i) recognizes the right of partnership creditors to share in a distribution of a
partner's estate after the separate creditors have been paid. There is no correlative right of
separate creditors of a partner to share directly in any distribution of partnership property,
their right being confined to that of sharing in the distribution of the property of the part-
ner, including his share of the capital and profits of the partnership distributed after part-
nership creditors have been fully paid. See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 40(b).
The jingle rule and its adaptations in the Bankruptcy Act and the Uniform Partner-
ship Act prescribe marshalling requirements that apparently apply irrespective of whether
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Bankruptcy Act.' Since the partners are liable for partnership obliga-
tions, the branch of the rule that precludes the distribution of the pro-
ceeds of a partner's property to partnership creditors unless and until
the partner's separate creditors have been paid in full has been criticized
as artificial and indefensible.' No question appears to have arisen,
the estates of the partnership and the partners are jointly or separately administered and
without regard to the size of any of the estates involved or to the extent of the liabilities to
partnership creditors or separate creditors. Although a majority of cases in the United
States and England have honored the priority of the separate creditors in the distribution
of the partner's estate, this application of the jingle rule has been much criticized, and a
number of courts declined to follow the rule in such a distribution. See F. MECHEM,
ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP §§ 453-56 (2d ed. 1920).
See Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act-A Reply to Mr. Crane's Criticism, 29
HARv. L. REV. 291, 306-07 (1916). Mr. Lewis thought that it would not only be unwise for the
Uniform Partnership Act to differ from the Bankruptcy Act but that it would be impossible
to get the Uniform Act widely adopted if it did not incorporate the jingle rule.
' Mr. Justice Story criticized the rule as artificial. See J. STORY, supra note 2, at
579-84. Professor Crane criticized the rule as logically indefensible. See J. CRANE, HAND-
BOOK ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP AND OTHER UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS 514 (2d ed.
1952) (citing and quoting J. PARSONS, PARTNERSHIP § 191 (1889)). See also J. MACLACHLAN,
supra note 2, § 355, at 424.
Professor James Parsons of the University of Pennsylvania, in the passage cited by
Professor Crane, emphasized that the assumption underlying the jingle rule, viz., that the
joint'creditors relied upon the firm assets and the separate creditors looked to the separate
estate for payment, contradicted experience. See J. PARSONS, supra, § 191. Another treatise
on partnership by another Parsons, Professor Theophilus Parsons of Harvard, had taken a
quite different position 22 years earlier: "It seems to us a simple rule, eminently practical,
and founded upon principles of justice and of policy, so certain and obvious, that they upon
whom the rule presses heavily are seldom disposed to question its general propriety. And
we cannot but think that, as a rule of equity, it is impregnable, and that it will be recognized
as a rule of law." T. PARSONS, PARTNERSHIP 482 (1867).
When Professor Joseph Beale's revision of the latter Parsons' treatise on partnership
appeared in 1893, however, the last sentence of the passage quoted in the preceding
paragraph had disappeared, and the following two sentences appeared in a footnote: "Since
the partners are liable for all firm debts, it would seem that thi partnership creditors might
also prove against the estates of the individual partners, and share with the other individual
creditors. That they may make proof of their claims against the individual estates is
everywhere admitted." T. PARSONS, PARTNERSHIP 476 n.1 (J. Beale ed. 4th ed. 1893).
The most recently published edition of Professor Crane's treatise also reflects a
modification of the view taken toward the jingle rule:
The predecessor of this work called it logically indefensible. The present
author feels less strongly and merely notes that the rule has been sharply criti-
cized for destroying or diminishing the partnership creditor's rights against part-
ners' separate property-which he has been led to expect by their joint or joint
and several liability for firm debts-at the very time when he most needs them.
But the law has been settled long enough that creditors must be charged with
knowledge of it and not permitted to complain of frustrated expectations. The
critics ... must be assuming that partnership credit is socially or economically
more important or productive than individual credit in order to enjoy priority in
one arena and parity in the other. To the extent that partnership credit is
business credit and individual credit is not, some such argument can be made. But
it has not been proved. Moreover, it seems quite doubtful in the age of mass con-
1983]
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however, regarding the propriety of the branch of the rule that accords
priority to partnership creditors in the distribution of the partnership
estate.'
The Commission on Bankruptcy Laws, following a recommendation
of the National Bankruptcy Conference,8 proposed the explicit abolition
of the jingle rule insofar as it postponed participation by partnership
creditors in the distribution of a separate partner's estate until his
creditors had been fully paid.9 The legislative reports accompanying the
bills that became the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Bankruptcy
Code)10 stated that section 723 "repeals the jingle rule, which, for ease
sumer credit ... which looms so large in the American economy. On the whole, the
rule seems to do rough justice. One would be hard put to improve, in the abstract,
its approximate balance.
J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 533 (1968).
' See In re Wilcox, 94 F. 84, 104 (D. Mass. 1899); J. MACLACHLAN, supra note 2, § 355,
at 424.
' See Kennedy, A New Deal for Partnership Bankruptcy, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 610,
630-32 (1960) (discussion of draft proposals for the National Bankruptcy Conference).
' See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES,
PART II, H.R. Doc. No. 137, PART II, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 111, 115 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
COMMISSION REPORT II]. Section 4-405(f) of the Commission's proposed Bankruptcy Act of
1973 read as follows: "The creditors of a partnership shall share in the distribution of the
proceeds of the estate of a general partner in the same manner and to the same extent as
other creditors of such partner." Id.
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified at
11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (Supp. IV 1980)). In this article all citations to the Bankruptcy
Reform Act are references to title 11 of the United States Code unless otherwise indicated.
"1 Section 723 of the Bankruptcy Code reads as follows:
§ 723. Rights of partnership trustee against general partners
(a) If there is a deficiency of property of the estate to pay in full all claims
allowed in a case under this title concerning a partnership, then each general part-
ner in such partnership is liable to the trustee for the full amount of such deficien-
cy.
(b) To the extent practicable, the trustee shall first seek recovery of such
deficiency from any general partner in such partnership that is not a debtor in a
case under this title. Pending determination of such deficiency, the court may
order any such partner to provide the estate with indemnity for, or assurance of
payment of, any deficiency recoverable from such partner, or not to dispose of
property.
(c) Notwithstanding section 728(c) of this title, the trustee has a claim
against the estate of each general partner in such partnership that is a debtor in a
case under this title for the full amount of all claims of creditors allowed in the
case concerning such partnership. Notwithstanding section 502 of this title, there
shall not be allowed in such case a claim against such partner on which both such
partner and such partnership are liable, except to any extent that such claim is
secured only by property of such partner and not be [by] property of such partner-
ship. The claim of the trustee under this subsection is entitled to distribution in
such case under section 726(a) of this title the same as any other claim of the kind
specified in such section.
(d) If the aggregate that the trustee recovers from the estates of general
partners under subsection (c) of this section is greater than any deficiency not
recovered under subsection (b) of this section, the court, after notice and a hear-
ing, shall determine an equitable distribution of the surplus so recovered, and the
[Vol. 40:55
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of administration, denied partnership creditors their rights against
general partners by permitting general partners' individual creditors to
share in their estates first to the exclusion of partnership creditors.'"2
The reports declared their purpose to track "more closely ... generally
applicable partnership law, without a significant administrative
burden.""3
The jingle rule is not explicitly overruled by the Bankruptcy Code,
however, and there is at least some risk that in view of the long accep-
tance of the rule for administration of partnership and partners' estates
in equity and in bankruptcy, the ancient rule may be deemed to have sur-
vived to the extent not inconsistent with the provisions of the Bankrupt-
cy Code. Section 723 is directly applicable only in partnership liquidation
cases under Chapter 7, and it is thus arguable that the jingle rule re-
mains the law applicable in other cases under the Bankruptcy Code."
The definition of "insolvency" in the Bankruptcy Code,"5 for example, in-
trustee shall distribute such surplus to the estates of the general partners in such
partnership according to such determination.
12 H. R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 381 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U. S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6337 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 95, reprinted in 1978 U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5881 [hereinafter cited as SEN.
REPORT].
3 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 381, 1978 U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6337; SEN.
REPORT, supra note 12, at 95, 1978 U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5881; see also HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 12, at 201, 1978 U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6161.
" The Bankruptcy Code provides for five kinds of cases, each governed by a different
chapter. Chapter 7 contemplates liquidation of a debtor's estate. Chapter 9 governs the ad-
justment of indebtedness of a municipal corporation or other eligible governmental unit.
Chapter 11 provides for the reorganization of a debtor, though a plan of liquidation may ac-
tually qualify as a plan of reorganization. Chapter 13 authorizes an individual, with or
without a spouse, to effect a composition or extension of debts, or both, by payments over
time up to five years. Eligibility for relief under the several chapters is governed by § 109.
A voluntary case may be commenced by an eligible debtor under any of these chapters. An
involuntary case may be commenced against an amenable debtor under Chapter 7 or
Chapter 11 by a party or parties other than the debtor.
The jingle rule could then apply in a partnership case under Chapter 11 as well as in a
partner's case under Chapter 7, 11, 13, or conceivably Chapter 9. Since a partnership is not
eligible for or amenable to relief under Chapter 9 or 13, the question of the applicability of
the jingle rule in a partnership case cannot arise under either of these chapters.
" Section 101(26)(B) defines "insolvent" to mean:
with reference to a partnership, financial condition such that the sum of such part-
nership's debts is greater than the aggregate of, at a fair valuation-
(i) all of such partnership's property, exclusive of property of the kind
specified in subparagraph (A(i) of this paragraph [ie., property fraudulently con-
cealed or transferred]; and
(ii) the sum of the excess of the value of each general partner's separate
property, exclusive of property of the kind specified in subparagraph (A)(ii) of this
paragraph [i e., property that may be exempted] over such partner's separate
debts.
Senate Bill 863, as passed by the Senate on July 17, 1981, during the first session of the 97th
Congress, would have substituted "nonpartnership" for "separate" each place it appears in
this definition. See S. 863, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S7894 (daily ed. July 17,
1981).
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eludes a provision applicable to partnerships that is substantially iden-
tical to the definition of partnership insolvency that has been applied
under the Bankruptcy Act."6 By providing that in the calculation of part-
nership insolvency, there shall be added to partnership property the
surplus of each general partner's separate property in excess of the
value of the partner's separate debts, the drafters arguably enshrined in
the new law the notion that partnership creditors should not participate
in the separate property of the partners except to the extent a surplus
exists.
Section 723 nevertheless negates the operation of the jingle rule in-
sofar as it would protect separate creditors of a partner from competi-
tion for the proceeds of the partner's estate by partnership creditors
whenever the partnership is a debtor under Chapter 7. It does not mat-
ter whether the partner is a debtor under Chapter 7, Chapter 11, or
Chapter 13, or is not a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code at all." This
" The definition of "insolvent" in § 1(19) of the Bankruptcy Act did not indicate how or
whether the separate property of the general partners should be counted in determining
partnership insolvency. Section 67d(1)(d) of the Bankruptcy Act, however, defined partner-
ship insolvency for the purposes of the section vesting power in the trustee to avoid a
fraudulent transfer. Section 67d(1l(d), which was an adaptation of § 2(2) of the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act, read in pertinent part as follows:
To determine whether a partnership is insolvent, there shall be added to the part-
nership property the present fair salable value of the separate property of each
general partner in excess of the amount required to pay his separate debts ....
Notwithstanding the restricted purpose of this definition of partnership insolvency, it was
an accurate statement of what most bankruptcy courts did in determining partnership in-
solvency for any purpose under the Bankruptcy Act. See 1A J. MOORE & L. KING, COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY 5.06 (14th ed. 1974).
The definition of partnership insolvency in § 101(26)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code is thus
consistent with, and is indeed derived from, the definitions of insolvency found in § 2(2) of
the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act and the adaptation thereof in § 67d(1)(d) of the
Bankruptcy Act. Under either system of distribution if, after application of the partnership
property to the payment of the partnership debts, there is still not enough separate prop-
erty of the partners to pay all of the debts of the partnership and the partners, the partner-
ship is insolvent. If the jingle rule is not applied, however, allowing the partnership
creditors to compete with the separate creditors in the distribution of the partners' estates
may render the partnership solvent, although the sepatate creditors of one or more part-
ners may not receive full payment.
"7 The fact that the partnership is a debtor under Chapter 7 presents no interpretive
difficulty when a petition for relief under Chapter 11 is filed by or against a member of the
partnership, so long as the partner meets the requirements of § 109(e). Nor is the fact that a
petitioner under Chapter 13 is a partner a ground for denying relief, even though the part-
nership is ineligible as a debtor under the chapter. The debtor must, of course, meet the re-
quirements of § 109(e) in order to be entitled to relief under Chapter 13. Cf. In re Krokos, 12
Bankr. 520, 4 COLLIER BANKR. CAs. 2D 1020, BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 68,220 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1981) (Chapter 13 petition filed jointly by husband and wife dismissed because relief sought
was for a partnership and all debts scheduled were liabilities of partnership). It is perhaps
unlikely that a municipality eligible under § 109(c) to file a petition for relief under Chapter
9 would be a partner, but there appears to be nothing in the Bankruptcy Code to preclude
such a possibility. The observations made in this note regarding partners apply equally to
general and limited partners.
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conclusion is -compelled by a consideration of the rights of a trustee of
the partnership granted by section 723.18
The radiations from section 723, moreover, suggest that it impinges
on far more than the liquidation of a partnership case under Chapter 7.
It is first to be noted that in a Chapter 11 case involving the reorganiza-
tion of a partnership debtor, the partnership creditors are entitled to in-
sist that a plan provide at least as much to each of them as would be
yielded by a liquidation of the partnership under Chapter 7.1" This means
that the partnership creditors may require the plan to reflect what
would be recoverable from the separate partners' estates without hin-
drance from the jingle rule. Section 723 may thus apply indirectly to a
Chapter 11 partnership case to the extent of imposing a minimum on the
distribution that must be provided for partnership creditors by a
reorganization plan."
When the partnership is not a debtor in a case under the Bankruptcy
Code, section 723 does not purport to prescribe the order of distribution
of the proceeds of a partner debtor's estate. It is thus arguable that the
distribution of a partner's estate in such a case shall be governed by non-
bankruptcy law." Since nonbankruptcy law has generally followed the
jingle rule,' the case law that has protected the separate creditors of a
partner from competition in the distribution of the proceeds of a
" If a partner is not a debtor in a case under the Bankruptcy Code, the partnership
trustee may, under §.723(a) and (b), seek recovery of any deficiency of the partnership prop-
erty to meet claims against the partnership, and there is no limitation of the recovery to the
value of the partner's separate property in excess of the partner's separate debts. If a part-
ner is a debtor under any chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, the partnership trustee has an
automatic claim under § 723(c) against the partner's estate for all the amount of the partner-
ship creditors' claims allowed in the partnership case. See infra text accompanying notes
61-73.
" Section 1129(a)(7) requires a plan to provide that each holder of a claim "will receive
or retain ... property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, that is not less than the
amount that such holder would so receive or retain if the debtor were liquidated under
Chapter 7 of this title on such date."
The House Report is at pains to point out in two places the relevance of § 723 in apply-
ing § 1129(a)(7) in a partnership case. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 200, 412-13, 1978
U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6160, 6368-69. See also Rosenberg, Partnership Reorganiza-
tion Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act. Filling in the Interstices, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1173,
1191, 1193 (1981); Structuring and Documenting Business Financing Transactions Under
the Federal Bankruptcy Code of 1978, 35 Bus. LAW. 1645, 1661 (1980).
So long as the minimum is provided by the plan, however, nothing in the Bankruptcy
Code forbids application of the jingle rule in a partnership case under Chapter 11, either in
a reorganization plan or a liquidation that is administered in a Chapter 11 case. If the propo-
nent of a Chapter 11 plan classifies the partnership creditors separately from the creditors
of the individual partners, there is a rational basis for the classification, and it may be
forcefully argued that the governing rules of distribution are to be found in the state laws
that would apply if no petition had been filed under the Bankruptcy Code. These rules
generally prescribe distribution according to a version of the jingle rule. See supra note 4.
1 See Kashner, Financihg Limited Partnerships and Their Partners: Caveat Creditor,
37 Bus. LAW. 171, 188 n.52 (1981).
' See supra note 4.
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partner's estate may remain fully applicable, at least until a partnership
becomes a debtor. As the excerpts from the legislative history of the
Bankruptcy Code quoted above suggest,' this result'seems not to have
been contemplated or intended, at least when the partner is a debtor in a
Chapter 7 case. If it was contemplated, it is surprising that neither the
statute nor the legislative history takes into account the complications
of administration that would ensue when a partnership case is commenced
after a case concerning one of its member partners has been partially
administered. The difficulties can be illustrated by the following
hypothetical case of Partner A, in which a distribution has been ordered
to A's separate creditors:
A 's estate ........................................... $1000
Partnership creditors' claims .......................... $2000
A's separate creditors' claims ........................ .$2000
If the jingle rule is applied, the partnership creditors are entitled to no
distribution and A's separate creditors receive no more than a fifty per-
cent distribution. 4 Suppose, however, that after this distribution but
before A's case is closed, the partnership of which A is a member
becomes a debtor in a case under the Bankruptcy Code. Section 723(c)
would now apply but with what consequence so far as the distribution is
concerned? Would section 723(c) now require a redistribution after
disgorgement by the separate creditors of part or all of what they have
received from the trustee of the partner's estate? The recovery of funds
distributed pursuant to orders of a court of competent jurisdiction is
repugnant to sensible administration. If the completed distribution ac-
cording to the jingle rule should be regarded as not subject to rectifica-
tion, there would remain the question of its effect on any subsequent
distribution in the event additional funds came into A's estate. Section
508(b), which requires an equalization of distribution when a partnership
creditor receives a payment or transfer from a partner who is not a debtor
in a Chapter 7 case,' would be inapplicable, though arguably it could be
applied by analogy.
Whatever conclusion is drawn concerning the appropriate solution of
the hypothetical problem presented in the preceding paragraph, it would
arise only if the jingle rule is deemed applicable in Partner A's case
prior to the commencement of the partnership's case. The consequence
of recognizing the survival of the jingle rule for application in partners'
cases but subject to termination or at least modification on institution of
, See supra text accompanying notes 12 & 13.
Cf. In re Saratoga Dev't Corp., 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. 1373, 15 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 767
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1978) (FDIC as assignee of partnership creditor's claim filed under Chapter
XI of the Bankruptcy Act against corporate partner subordinated to unsecured claims of
partner's separate creditors).
I See infra text accompanying notes 127-36.
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a case by or against the partnership would generate such confusion,
litigation, delay, and inordinate expense of administration that the
courts can be expected to eschew its application. 8 Notwithstanding
theoretical and analytical justifications that may be advanced for the
jingle rule's viability under the Bankruptcy Code, pragmatic considera-
tions and cogent evidence of legislative intent that it be abolished re-
quire its general rejection as a guide to distribution under the new law.'
If partnership creditors may insist on application of the rule of § 723 in a partnership
case, efforts of separate creditors of the partners to obtain the benefits of the jingle rule by
keeping the partnership out of the bankruptcy court are unlikely to succeed when much is
at stake. Even if the partnership becomes a debtor in a Chapter 11 case, the right of the
partnership creditors to insist on a plan that treats them as well as would a liquidation in
which the partner's separate creditors are denied priority in a partner's estate is a serious
restriction on the protection derivable by the separate creditors from the jingle rule. To
avoid or minimize the problems referred to in the text, partnership creditors will be well ad-
vised to file a petition against the partnership as soon as possible after a-petition has been
filed by or against a partner. Whether it will also be advisable to seek an order for relief
against other partners will depend on an assessment of the comparative advantages to the
partnership creditors of the rights afforded them by subsections (a) and (b) and by subsec-
tion (c) of § 723. In view of the fact that the rights given by subsections (a) and (b) are in no
way subordinated to the rights of the separate creditors, the partnership creditors will not
ordinarily have any incentive to institute involuntary proceedings against partners under
the Bankruptcy Code.
General nonpayment of his debts, including those owed partnership creditors by a
partner, is a sufficient ground for an involuntary petition to be filed against the partner by
partnership creditors. See HousE REPORT, supra note 12, at 198, 1978 U. S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 6158; Kennedy, The Commencement of a Case Under the New Bankruptcy Code,
36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 977, 1006 (1979).
" In addition to the excerpts from the legislative history quoted in the text accompa-
nying notes 12 and 13 supra, the House Report and Senate Report both contain the state-
ment that "[c]laims of partnership creditors who may have filed against the partner will be
disallowed to avoid double counting." HousE REPORT, supra note 12, at 381, 1978 U. S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6337; SEN. REPORT, supra note 12, at 95, 1978 U. S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5881. The natural reading of this passage suggests that the drafters of the statute
and legislative explanation were thinking of the situation in which a partner was a debtor
under the Bankruptcy Code before the partnership became one. It contemplates that the
partnership creditors' claims may be filed and allowed against the partner's estate unless
and until the partnership trustee's aggregate claim on behalf of all the partnership creditors
becomes effective under § 723(c). The partnership creditors' claims then are disallowed only
"to avoid double counting." If the partnership creditors' claims against the partner's estate
filed prior to the commencement of the partnership case were to be subordinated (and in ef-
fect disallowed if the partner's estate was insufficient to pay all the separate creditors'
claims), the significant effect of § 72 3(c) would not be the disallowance of the partnership
creditors' claims to avoid double counting but rather a dramatic advance in their priority as
a part of the partnership trustee's aggregate claim. The reading of the intent behind §
723(c)'s second sentence espoused here is also supported in the House Report: "Such a
creditor [£e., a creditor of the partnership] may file a claim against a partner that is a debtor
in a case under title 11, but as soon as the order for relief is entered in a case under Chapter
7 concerning the partnership, the creditor's claim is disallowed." HousE REPORT, supra note
12, at 200, 1978 U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6161.
The House Report, in discussing who may file an involuntary petition against a part-
ner, declared that "holders of claims against the partnership would be holders of claims
19831
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II. CLAIMS AGAINST A PARTNERSHIP
A partnership may incur debts, including contractual obligations and
liabilities in tort. 8 The allowability of a partnership creditor's claim
generally depends on nonbankruptcy law but, like other claims against a
debtor in a case under the Bankruptcy Code, is subject to section 502.'
The partnership creditor is also subject to the same procedural require-
ments respecting the filing of a proof of claim as is the creditor of any
other kind of debtor20 The trustee of the partnership may assert any
against the partner for purposes of 11 U.S.C. 303." Id. at 198, 1978 U. S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 6158-59. The Report further explained that "[t]his is true even though such claim
would not be allowed under 11 U.S.C. 723(c) if the partnership were a debtor under Chapter
7." Id. (There is a reference in the House Report at this point to the provision in § 40 of the
Uniform Partnership Act that "requires a partner to make contributions necessary for pay-
ment of all partnership liabilities," but this reference may be treated as gratuitous for pfe-
sent purposes.) The explicit recognition of the creditors of the partnership as creditors of
the partners for the purposes of § 303 implies no negation of the right of a creditor of the
partnership to standing as a creditor of the partner for other purposes of the Bankruptcy
Code, including the filing of claims under § 501 and § 502. Neither does the recognition in §
502(a) that a partner's creditor is a party in interest for the purpose of objecting to a claim
against the partnership estate imply any lack of standing on the part of a partnership.
creditor to object to a claim against a partner's estate. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at
352, 1978 U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6308; SEN. REPORT, supra note 12, at 62, 1978 U. S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5848; 124 CONG. REc. 32396 (Sept. 28, 1978) (Congressman Ed-
wards' statement); 124 CONG. REC. 33996 (Oct. 6, 1978) (Senator DeConcini's statement). See
also infra text accompanying notes 37-40.
It is generally stated or assumed in commentary on the Bankruptcy Code that the
"jingle rule" has been abolished insofar as it protected the partner's separate property from
claims of partnership creditors until the partner's separate creditors were paid in full. See,
e.g., 4 L. KING, COLLIER ON BAiNKRUPTCY 723.04[3] (15th ed. 1979); H. MILLER & M. COOK, A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT 92 (1979); Levit, Creditors and Claims, in
THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978, at 124 (G. Holmes ed. 1979) ("Why the Code should
depart from this long-standing practice is most difficult to understand."); Hanley, Partner-
ship Bankruptcy Under the New Act, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 149, 177-79 (1979); but see Structur-
ing and Documenting Business Financing Transactions Under the Federal Bankruptcy
Code of 1978, 35 Bus. LAW. 1645, 1661 (1980) ("Direct claims by partnership creditors against
bankruptcy estates of general partners would be disallowed, except to the extent that such
claims are secured solely by property of a general partner.").
' Contractual obligations of a partnership typically are incurred by a partner or other
agent of the partnership in the ordinary course of its business; See F. MECHEM, supra note
4, § 306. A tort committed by a partner or agent of the partnership in the ordinary course of.
its business may give rise to a liability of the partnership estate. See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP
ACT § 13; F. MECHEM, supra note 4, § 301.
Section 502 prescribes certain limitations to the allowability of claims, but the validi-
ty and allowable amount of most claims depend on applicable nonbankruptcy law.
" The governing provisions are found in §§ 501 and 502 and Rules 301-307 of the Rules
of Bankruptcy Procedure to the extent the rules do not contravene the Bankruptcy Code.
The Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure were originally promulgated by the Supreme Court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2075, as enacted by Pub. L. No. 88-623, § 1, 78 Stat. 1001 (1964), to
govern practice and procedure under the Bankruptcy Act. By § 405(d) of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 405(d), 92 Stat. 2685 (1978), Congress provided that these
rules shall apply to cases under the Bankruptcy Code to the extent not inconsistent with the
Code until these rules are superseded by rules prescribed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1976
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defense against a claim that would have been available to the partner-
ship under nonbankruptcy law."
The holder of a claim against a partner does not on that account hold
a claim against the partnership.2 His claim may be asserted against the
partner's share in any surplus remaining after administration of the
partnership estate.3 That surplus may be distributed to the partner's
creditors in the course of a joint administration of the partnership and
partner's estates, but otherwise the partner's creditor's recourse will be
outside the bankruptcy court or perhaps in a partner's case adminis-
tered independently in another bankruptcy court.
As under the Bankruptcy Act, a creditor holding a secured claim is
secured only to the extent of the value of the property of the debtor.
& Supp. 1I 1979) as amended by § 247 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 95-598, §
247, 92 Stat. 2672 (1978). This amendment deleted a sentence in 28 U.S.C. § 2975 which gave
paramount effect to rules in conflict with other laws, including congressional enactments.
In the meantime, Interim Rules suggested by the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy
Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States have been widely adopted by district
and bankruptcy courts to govern practice and procedure in areas where neither the
previously promulgated Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure nor the Bankruptcy Reform Act
provided any guidance. The effect of the amendment of 28 U.S.C. § 2075 and the Interim
Rules is discussed in Kennedy, Some Comments About the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 85 COM. L.J. 125 (1980). Proposed Bankruptcy, Rules
3001-3008 have been submitted for consideration by the Supreme Court for ultimate pro-
mulgation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (Supp. III 1979). When promulgated, they will
supersede the current Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 301-307 insofar as practice under the
Bankruptcy Code is concerned.
31 See § 541(e). But the trustee may not invoke as a defense that the claim is unenforce-
able under nonbankruptcy law because contingent or unmatured. See § 502(b)(1).
I See Mead v. City Nat'l Bank of Clinton,'232 Iowi 1276, 8 N.W.2d 417 (1943); Shirk v.
Caterbone, 201 Pa. Super. 544, 193 A.2d 664 (1963); F. MECHEM, supra note 4, § 443; HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 12, at 197, 1978 U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6158 ("[Hlolders of claims
against the partners but not against the partnership obviously do not qualify as petitioning
creditors against the partnership.").
Whether a claim against a partner is that of a partnership creditor or a claim against
the partner as an individual frequently depends on a resolution of a factual dispute. See,
e.g., In re 765 Assoc., 21 Bankr. 867 (Bankr. D. Hawaii 1982) (claim on promissory note
against partnership rejected in the absence of any showing that the note was executed on
behalf of the partnership or that it had received any benefit from the money lent).
3 See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 28(1); cf. In re Urban Dev. Co. & Assoc., 452 F.
Supp. 902, 906 (D. Md. 1978) (judgment creditors of general partners do not have judgment
liens against partnership realty held in the name of partners and must compete with other
unsecured creditors of partners in partners' share of partnership property). The legislative
history of the Bankruptcy Code indicates an intent to adhere to this view of the partner's
claim vis-a-vis the partnership property. "[Tihe jingle rule still applies in principle with
respect to the partners interest in the partnership. The partners interest is worthless until
all administrative expenses and partnership claims have been paid." HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 12, at 201, 1978 U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6161.
" See § 506(a). The value of the security interest is determined by the court pursuant
to FED. R. BANKR. P. 306(d). Since the rule is consistent with the Bankruptcy Code, it con-
tinues to apply under the new law. See supra note 30. Proposed Bankruptcy Rule 3012 is
substantially to the same effect as Rule 306(d) but makes explicit the requirement of a hear-
ing on notice to the holder of the secured claim.
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Section 506(a) clarifies the law governing the determination of the rights
of such a creditor by declaring that his claim is an unsecured one to the
extent that the value of the creditor's interest in the debtor's property is
less than the amount of the creditor's allowed claim. A question unset-
tled under the Bankruptcy Act was whether a partnership creditor
secured only by property of a partner was required to deduct its value in
filing a claim against the partnership estate. There is less basis under
the Bankruptcy Code than there was under the Bankruptcy Act for re-
garding a partner's property as part of the estate of the partnership.'
Accordingly, it appears that the partnership creditor may ignore his
right to security in a partner's separate property when filing a claim
against the partnership."
Although a creditor of a partner may not file a claim against the part-
nership estate,37 section 502(a) explicitly recognizes that such a creditor
has standing to object to a claim filed by a creditor of the partnership
against the partnership estate. The version of section 502(a) in H.R. 8200
as originally passed by the House did not contain any reference to this
special standing of a partner's creditor,' but both the House and Senate
Reports pointed out that the category of parties in interest would be ex-
panded under the new law as a result of the change in the liability of a
general partner's estate for the debts of his partnership.3 9 It was
thereafter concluded that such a subtle change in the law of standing
should not be left to legislative history, and the inclusion of "a creditor
of a partner in a partnership" in the term "party in interest" in a part-
nership case was made in the final draft of the Bankruptcy Code as it
emerged from the conference of the managers of the House and Senate
bills. Their joint statement explained: "Since the trustee of the partner-
ship is given an absolute claim against the estate of each general partner
I See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 199-200, 1978 U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
6160.
"' The nature and the validity of the lien are irrelevant. A postpetition payment or
transfer of property by a partner in discharge of a lien securing a partnership creditor's
claim does not affect the creditor's right to continue to receive distribution from the part-
nership estate. Cf. § 508(b) discussed in the text accompanying notes 127-36 infra. The part-
nership creditor, of course, would not be allowed to receive or retain any distribution in ex-
cess of the amount of his allowed claim. Cf. Swarts v. Fourth Nat'l Bank of St. Louis, 117 F.
1, 12-13 (8th Cir. 1902) (if dividends on a creditor's claim plus payments received from a surety
aggregate more than entire amount of claim plus interest, creditor holds surplus in trust for
surety).
The value of security in the partner's property, of course, must be deducted from the
partnership creditor's claim against the partner's estate. A special problem arises in the ad-
ministration of the partner's estate because of the risk of double proof of a claim of the part-
nership creditor. See infra text accompanying notes 61-73 (discussion of second sentence of
§ 723(c)).
See supra text accompanying note 32.
See H. R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 502(a) (1977), 123 CONG. REC. 35652 (Oct. 28,
1977).
" See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 352, 1978 U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6308;
SEN. REPORT, supra note 12, at 62, 1978 U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5848.
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under section 723(c), creditors of the partner must have standing to ob-
ject to claims against the partnership at the partnership level because
no opportunity will be afforded at the partner's level for such objection."40
Other partnership creditors may, of course, make objections to any claim
made against the partnership estate, but "the demands of orderly and
expeditious administration have led to a recognition that the right to ob-
ject is generally centered in the trustee as provided in subdivision (a)" of
Rule 306."' If a partner is also a debtor in a case under the Bankruptcy
Code, the trustee of the partner's estate should likewise be recognized
as an appropriate party in interest to object to a claim against the part-
nership estate. It is not to be inferred from the recognition of the stand-
ing of the partner's creditor in section 502(a) that he may vote for a
trustee of the partnership4" or for or against a plan of reorganization for
the partnership under Chapter 11. On the other hand, the statutory
status should enable him to appear and be heard in a partnership case
whenever he can show that the determination of an issue may adversely
affect his interest.
4
May a partner file a claim against the partnership? A partner may
have three varieties of claims against the partnership: (a) claims arising
from advances and payments beyond the amount of capital which he
agreed to contribute; 45 (b) claims for return of capital;" and (c) claims for
profits.4 ' All three categories of claims appear to be embraced by the
broad definition of "claim" in section 101(4),4 though this reading was
disavowed by a House Report comment on the eligibility of partners as
, 124 CONG. REC. 32396 (Sept. 28, 1978) (Congressman Edwards' statement); 124 CONG.
REC. 33996 (Oct. 5, 1978) (Senator DeConcini's statement).
' FED. R. BANKR. P. 306(c) Advisory Committee Note. A statement to the same effect
is included in the Advisory Committee Note to proposed Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure
3007.
" Only creditors of the partnership may vote for a trustee of the partnership estate,
but the law governing the eligibility to vote in elections of trustees for partnerships and
partners has been and remains confusing. Compare FED. R. BANKR. P. 210(a) & (e) with pro-
posed Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2009.
O nly holders of claims against the debtor may vote for or against a plan of
reorganization of a partnership. See § 1126(a).
4, Whenever a creditor of a partner asserts a standing as a party in interest, pursuant
to § 502(a) or otherwise, in a partnership case where the same person is serving as a trustee
of the partnership and the partner's estates, the court should be alert to the possibility of a
conflict of interest on the part of the trustee. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 117(b), 210(d) and Ad-
visory Committee Note; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 198, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 6159. In any case where there is a deficiency of partnership assets and a partner
debtor has both nonexempt property and separate creditors, a conflict of interest is prac-
tically unavoidable.
'5 See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 40(b)(II).
" See id. § 40(b)(III).
, See id. § 40(b)(IV).
The definition of "claim" in § 101(4) of the Bankruptcy Code includes a "right to pay-
ment, whether or not reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent,
matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured .... "
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petitioners on an involuntary petition. 9 Without disclosing any authority
or the process for reaching its conclusion, the House Report indicated
that a partner may independently hold a claim against the partnership
but is not a holder of a claim by virtue of his partnership interest.'
Section 5h of the Bankruptcy Act cryptically authorized the court to
"permit the proof of the claim of the partnership estate against the in-
dividual estates, and vice versa."5 This provision was given little effect
or attention in the reported cases or by the commentators except as part
of a general grant of authority to "secure the equitable distribution of
the property of the several estates." 2 There is no counterpart in the
Bankruptcy Code of this provision of the Bankruptcy Act, but, as
discussed below, 3 section 723(d) provides for "an equitable distribution"
whenever the trustee of a partnership estate recovers a surplus pur-
suant to subsections (b) and (c) of section 723. Moreover, section 510(c)
authorizes the court, under the principles of equitable subordination, to
subordinate for the purposes of distribution "all or part of an allowed
claim to all or part of another allowed claim or all or part of an allowed
interest to all or part of another allowed interest." Rules governing
distribution in the dissolution of a partnership are equitable in origin,
and they have consistently subordinated partners' claims, including
those arising out of advances and the assumption of liabilities of the
firm, to the claims of outside creditors.' There has never been any doubt
about the propriety of adhering to these equitable rules in distributions
under the Bankruptcy Act,5 and there is no evidence in the Bankruptcy
Code or its legislative history of any intent to depart from these
equitable rules.
An argument may nevertheless be made, particularly where the
Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act applies,56 that the partner's
, See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 197, 1978 U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6158.
Id. Only two sentences later and on the same page the same House Report declared
mysteriously that "[1imited partners that independently hold non-contingent unsecured
claims may qualify as claimholders for purposes of 11 U.S.C. 303(b)(2), though general part-
ners may not." Id.
" The legislative drafters were apparently thinking of concurrent administrations of
the partnership and partners' estates and that the trustee of each estate might file a claim
on behalf of the creditors he represented against the estate of the partnership or the part-
ners' estates. When a partner was not undergoing administration, he would ordinarily have
been the only appropriate person to file a proof of claim against the partnership estate in
respect to any of the three types of claims he might have held against the partnership.
52 See, e.g., 1A J. MOORE & L. KING, supra note 16, 11 5.22, 5.24, 5.25; J. CRANE & A.
BROMBERG, supra note 6, at 544, 551, 556; J. MACLACHLAN, supra note 2, at 426-27.
' See infra text accompanying notes 137-49.
' See Wallerstein v. Ervin, 112 F. 124 (3d Cir. 1901); In re Hess, 1 F.2d 342, 344 (W.D.
Pa. 1923); In re Effinger, 184 F. 728, 729-35 (D. Md. 1911); In re Rice, 164 F. 509 (E.D. Pa.
1908); J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, supra note 6, at 550-51; F. MECHEM, supra note 4, § 451.
See Hecker, supra note 2, at 14; Cf. J. MACLACHLAN, supra note 2, at 427.
Arkansas, Connecticut, Maryland, Minnesota, Washington, West Virginia, and




claim for any advances beyond contributed capital should be allowed and
accorded the.same priority as the claim of a nonpartner creditor. Section
804(1) of the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act explicitly ac-
cords the same priority to general and limited partners and outside
creditors for claims other than for return of capital and distribution of
profits. 7 A.suggested rationale for the rule subordinating a partner's
claim against the partnership to the claims of creditors other than part-
ners is that the distribution to the partner would have to be applied to
the payment of partnership creditors' claims in any event until their
claims have been paid in full. The rationale has been criticized as a
distortion in principle because the distribution to the partner should
first be applied to separate creditors' claims.' The force of the criticism
is considerably diminished under the Bankruptcy Code, at least insofar
as liquidations of partnership estates are concerned, since the distribu-
tion to the partner would be applied to claims of the creditors of the
partnership and the partner on a pro rata basis. 9 The criticism may
nevertheless have influenced the drafters of the Revised Uniform
Limited Partnership Act in their elimination of the subordination of a
partner's claims, except for distributive shares, to other creditors'
claims.
III. CLAIMS AGAINST A PARTNER
A. Concurrent Administration of a Partner's
and the Partnership Estate:
1. The Partnership Trustee's Claim
Claims that may be filed and allowed against a partner in a case
under the Bankruptcy Code include those held by partnership creditors
as well as those held by separate creditors." If the partnership is a debtor
This change is questioned in Kessler, The New Uniform Limited Partnership Act:
A Critique, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 159, 172-73 (1979). See also Hecker, supra note 2, at 16-17.
See J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, supra note 6, at 550.
5 This is the implication of § 723. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 381, 1978 U. S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6337; SEN. REPORT, supra note 12, at 95, 1978 U. S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5881. Distribution of a partner's estate is discussed at the text accompanying
notes 60-99 infra.
' This proposition is based more on legislative history and implications of the
Bankruptcy Code than on any explicit language in it. See the excerpt in note 27 supra
quoted from the HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 200, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
6161. See also id. at 198, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6158-59: "Since section 40 of the
Uniform Partnership Act requires a partner to make contributions necessary for payment
of all partnership liabilities, holders of claims against the partnership would be holders of
claims against the partner for purposes of 11 U.S.C. 303." Later the House Report declared
that "[t]he final sentence of 11 U.S.C. 723(c) makes clear that the jingle rule is abolished with
respect to the partnership creditor's rights in the assets of a partner," and that "[t]his
recognizes the traditional rights of creditors of the partnership to share on an equal basis
with other creditors of a partner under some nonbankruptcy laws adopted before the
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in a Chapter 7 case under the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee of the part-
nership has a claim against the estate of the general partner for the full
amount of all claims of creditors allowed in the partnership case."1 The
trustee's claim is automatically entitled to distribution; it need not be filed
or allowed."2 "Also, the claim preempts the claims of creditors of the
partnership that have filed claims against the partnership on account of
the partnership's liability." 3 The claim of a partnership creditor against
the partner's estate is ordinarily limited to the amount of his claim
against the partnership. A qualification on this limitation is recognized
Uniform Partnership Act." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 200-01, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 6161. See also discussion of § 502(9) in HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 352,
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6308; SEN. REPORT, supra note 12, at 62, 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5848.
Explanations of an amendment to § 723(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, added at a very late
stage of the legislative process, confusingly suggested that, as under prior law, the several
sections of the Bankruptcy Code applicable to codebtors and sureties apply to "the relation-
ship of a partner with respect to a partnership debtor." 124 CONG. REC. 32401 (Sept. 28,
1978) (Congressman Edwards' statement); 124 CONG. REC. 34001 (Oct. 5, 1978) (Senator
DeConcini's statement). The reference to "a partnership debtor" was undoubtedly intended
to refer to "the partnership as a debtor." There is some authority for treating a partner
under the Bankruptcy Act as a codebtor or surety for the partnership on a partnership debt
in the absence of an explicit assumption of a separate obligation by the partner. See In re
Helmwood Apts., 2 BANK& CT. DEC. 1151, 1157 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1976). Professor
MacLachlan has observed: "Since under the entity theory the partner is still liable upon the
firm debts, his position becomes like that of a surety. Indeed, he has an equity of exonera-
tion out of the firm assets, if they suffice, which conforms to the surety-like nature of his
obligation. The liabilities of a surety are not and should not be deferred to his other
liabilities." J. MACLACHLAN, supra note 2, at 425. But cf. Francis v. McNeal, 228 U.S. 695,
699-700 (1913) (per Holmes, J.): "But the fact remains as true as ever that partnership debts
are debts of the members of the firm, and that the individual liability of the members is not
collateral like that of a surety, but primary and direct, whatever priorities there may be in
the marshalling of assets." See also infra notes 92 & 135.
" See § 723(c) (first sentence). The first sentence of § 723(c) is in a section that applies
only in liquidation cases under Chapter 7. See § 103(b). By its terms the sentence applies
whenever the partnership is a debtor in a case under title 11, but a technical amendment
that passed the Senate but not the House would have limited the sentence to the situation
where the partnership is a debtor under Chapter 7. See S. 863, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 64(a)
(1981), 127 CONG. REC. S7900 (daily ed. July 17, 1981). As has been noted in the text accompa-
nying notes 19 and 20 supra, however, any plan proposed under Chapter 11 must assure to
each creditor or equity security holder as much as he would receive or retain if the debtor
were liquidated under Chapter 7. See § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii). In consequence, the debtor or other
proponent of a plan must make a provision for each creditor or limited partner of a general
partnership that takes into account potential recoveries or distribution from the partners'
estates.
" See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 200, 1978 U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6161.
63 Id. The quoted sentence is confusing in its reference to "filed claims against the
partnership." The context suggests that the intention was to refer to claims of creditors of
the partnership that had been filed against the partner on account of his liability for the
partnership debts. See supra note 27. Section 723(c) cannot conceivably be read to pre-empt
the claims of the creditors of the partnership against the partnership estate, whether or not
they have filed their claims against the partnership.
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when the creditor has a security interest in the property of the partner
but not in the partnership's property.' The purpose of requiring the dis-
allowance of the claim against the partner is to protect the partner's
estate against double proof of what is essentially a single claim by the
partnership creditor.' The result is that the partnership creditor who
has taken the precaution to obtain the personal obligation of a partner
has no advantage over any other partnership creditor in the event of
concurrent administration of the partnership and partner's estates.' Dif-
ficulties of administration are engendered by the prescription of the
amount of the trustee's claim in section 723(c) as the "full amount of all
claims of creditors allowed in the case concerning such partnership,"
particularly when the partnership case is commenced after the partner's
case. Until the time for filing claims in the partnership case has elapsed
and most if not all objections to the claims that are filed have been
resolved," distribution of any dividends in the partner's case would be
hazardous in view of the uncertainty pending the arrival of that time
when the amount of what will ordinarily be the largest claim against the
estate has been determined.
See infra text accompanying notes 84-85.
"Claims of partnership creditors who may have filed against the partner will be
disallowed to avoid double counting." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 381, 1978 U. S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6337; SEN. REPORT, supra note 12, at 95, 1978 U. S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5881.
" The construction suggested here is not ineluctable or inexorable. When it applies,
the second sentence of § 723(c) does nevertheless literally preclude any allowance of the
unsecured claim of a partnership creditor against the partner's estate, without regard to
whether the creditor relies on the liability of the partner as a member of the partnership or
on a separately contracted obligation. To allow a partnership creditor with a separate
obligation obtained from a partner to file and compete with the partnership trustee would
permit double proof on a single claim. It would be highly inequitable not only to the
separate creditors of the partner but also to the partnership creditors who did not obtain
separate obligations from the partner. It comports with the policy of the reform embodied
in § 723 to give a partnership creditor one and only one claim against the partner's estate,
whether or not the creditor obtained a collateral obligation from the partner.
" Time limits are prescribed for filing claims by the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.
Most claims in Chapter 7 cases may be filed anytime within six months after the first date
set for the meeting of creditors convened pursuant to § 341 of the Bankruptcy Code, but
that time may be later or extended for particular claimants. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 302(e).
Proposed Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3002(c) would require claims in a Chapter 7 case to
be filed within 90 days after the first date set for the first meeting of creditors subject to ex-
ceptions comparable to those in current Rule 302(e). It is to be noted' that the trustee or
debtor in possession of a partnership in a Chapter 11 case has an automatic claim against
the estate of any partner of the partnership who becomes a debtor in a Chapter 7 case. A
claim need not be filed in a Chapter 11 case under § 1111(a) unless it is scheduled as
disputed, contingent, or unliquidated or is not scheduled at all. Unless the court prescribes a
different time, a claim may be filed at any time prior to approval of the disclosure statement
in a Chapter 11 case. See INTERIM BANKE. R. 3001(b)(3). Proposed Rule of Bankruptcy Pro-
cedure 3003(b)(3) simply vests authority in the bankruptcy court to fix the time for filing
claims in a Chapter 11 case.
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Since the partnership trustee's claim against the estate of a partner
is fixed by section 723(c) as the "full amount of all claims of creditors
allowed in the case concerning such partnership," it is to be determined
as of the time of the filing of the petition by or against the partnership.6 8
The claims of the creditors of the partner will, on the other hand, be
determinable as of the time of the filing of the petition by or against the
partner. So far as the language of the statute bears on the matter,
distributions to the partnership creditors from the partnership estate do
not diminish the amount of the partnership trustee's claim against the
partner's estate, whether they occur before or after the commencement
of the partner's case." It does not even matter that the distributions
may have included funds derived from a recovery from the partner pur-
suant to section 723(a) and (b). No new claims can be acquired against the
partnership estate after the commencement of the partnership case,
whereas, if the partner's case commences later, the partner's estate may
continue to incur liabilities to separate creditors during the pendency of
the partnership case and until the commencement of the partner's case.
Administrative claims against the partnership estate" are not included
in the partnership trustee's claim against the partner's estate. If the
partner's case commences before the partnership case, however,
distributions to the partnership creditors in the partner's case prior to
the commencement of the partnership case diminish the partnership
trustee's claim. 1
When the partnership and partner's cases commence at different
times, the differences in the dates of reference for determining claims
have an impact on the accrual of interest on unsecured claims against
the two estates. When the partnership case is commenced first, interest
continues to run on the claims of unsecured creditors of the partner until
the commencement of his case, whereas interest on the unsecured claims
of the creditors of the partnership terminates, at least for most pur-
poses,71 on the commencement of the partnership case.71 When the part-
ner's case commences before the partnership case, however, interest on
the claims of the creditors of the partnership and the separate creditors
of the partner against the partner's estate terminates simultaneously,
' See § 502(b).
" Section 508(b), which requires equalization of distributions to partnership creditors
when payments or transfers are received from general partners who are not debtors in
Chapter 7 cases, does not apply to the administration of the estate of a partner. See infra
text accompanying notes 127-36. A court might undertake to apply this provision by way of
analogy, of course.
71 See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
" See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
72 Interest on allowed unsecured claims against the partnership (or any other debtor)
would continue to accrue at the legal rate from the date of the filing of the petition and to
the holders of such claims under § 726(a)(5) if the holders of claims under the preceding four
paragraphs of § 726(a) had been paid in full.
" See § 502(b)(2).
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but interest on the partnership creditor's claim against the partnership
estate continues to accrue until the commencement of the partnership
case.
2. The Secured Claim of a Partnership Creditor
When the partnership and partner's estates are being concurrently
administered, is the amount of the partnership trustee's claim given him
by section 723(c) inclusive or exclusive of the value of security held by
the partnership creditors? When the security interest is in the property
of the partnership, section 506(a) requires no deduction of the value of
such security from a claim against the partner's estate, and thus the
trustee's aggregate claim should be unaffected by the existence of
security in the partnership property. If a partnership creditor has a
claim secured by property of the partner, however, section 723(c) is
clear, in its second sentence74 that the creditor's claim against the part-
ner is not subject to disallowance to the extent of the security in the
partner's property. Congress can hardly have intended for the trustee of
the partnership to share in the partner's unencumbered estate to the ex-
tent of the claim secured by the partner's property. It is therefore sub-
mitted that the partnership trustee's aggregate claim should be reduced
by the value of the property in the partner's estate securing the partner-
ship creditor.
Suppose now that the partnership creditor is secured by both part-
nership property and by property of the partner. The second sentence
may and should be limited in its effect to simply recognizing the en-
forceability of the partnership creditor's lien against the property in the
partner's estate. The partnership creditor's claim against the partner is
not allowable to the extent that it is unsecured or to the extent that it is
secured by partnership property. The partnership trustee's aggregate
claim against the partner's estate should nevertheless include the part-
nership creditor's claim to the extent it is not secured by the partner's
property, even though it is or may be secured by the partnership proper-
ty or another partner's property.
3. Priority Claims of Partnership Creditors
The last sentence of section 723(c) declares that the claim of the
trustee under the subsection is entitled to distribution under section
" The second sentence of § 723(c) contains a typographical error that requires a
rereading and correction in order for the purpose and effect of the sentence to be perceived.
As enacted, it reads as follows:
Notwithstanding section 502 of this title, there shall not be allowed in such case a
claim against such partner on which both such partner and such partnership are
liable, except to any extent that such claim is secured only by property of such
partner and not be property of such partnership.
Id. The word "be" in the last line should be "by".
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726" "the same as any other claim of the kind specified in such section."
This sentence reeks with ambiguity, and the legislative history does not
dissipate the uncertainties. The legislative reports declare that "[t]he
trustee will share equally with the partners' individual creditors in the
assets of the partners' estate."78 As has already been intimated," a part-
nership creditor secured by property of the partner will presumably
receive the proceeds realized from the sale of the property, without any
participation by the partnership trustee in the distribution. But suppose
the claim of the partnership creditor is entitled to priority under section
507 because, for example, it is a claim for wages, a consumer deposit, or a
tax claim of recent vintage. Priority under section 507 typically depends
on a particular relationship between the creditor and the debtor, and it
is at best doubtful that the fact that a claim is entitled to priority in the
distribution of a partnership estate should support a claim for priority in
the distribution of the partner's estate. 8
4. Administrative Expenses
In any event it is clear that administrative expense claims entitled
to priority in the partnership case are not allowable at any level in the
partner's case. The amount of the partnership trustee's claim is
deliberately fixed by reference in section 723(c) to the "full amount of all
claims of creditors allowed in the case concerning such partnership."
The version of section 723(c) in H.R. 8200 as originally passed by the
House included "all claims allowed in the case,"" but, as stated in the
legislative explanation of the changes made in the finally enacted ver-
sion of the bill, "[b]y restricting the trustee's rights to claims of
,creditors,' the trustee of the partnership will not have a claim against
the general partners for administrative expenses or claims allowed in
the case concerning the partnership."8
The implication of section 723(c) is that distribution of dividends on
the claim of the trustee of the partnership should be made to the trustee
rather than directly to the partnership creditors. Like the proceeds of
any recovery by the trustee under section 544(b) or any other section of
the Bankruptcy Code, the distribution from the partner's estate becomes
"' The last sentence of § 723(c) refers to distribution under § 726(a), but a technical
amendment passed by the Senate but not acted on by the House would have deleted the
reference to subsection (a). See S. 863, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 64(b)(3) (1981), 127 CONG. REC.
S7900 (daily ed. July 17, 1981). There is no apparent reason the other subsections of § 726
should not apply in the distribution of the partner's estate to the partnership trustee.
"' HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 381, 1978 U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6337; SEN.
REPORT, supra note 12, at 95, 1978 U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5881.
7 See the discussion in the preceding two paragraphs of the text.
78 See infra text accompanying notes 86 & 87.
7' H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 723(c), 123 CONG. REc. 35659 (Oct. 28, 1977).
124 CONG. REC. 32401 (Sept. 28, 1978) (Congressman Edwards' statement); 124 CONG.
REC. 34000:01 (Oct. 5, 1978) (Congressman DeConcini's statement).
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part of the partnership estate, and its distribution is governed by sec-
tion 726. Accordingly, although the partner's estate is not liable to the
trustee of the partnership for the amount of the administrative expenses
allowed or allowable in the partnership case, the dividends distributed
from the partner's estate to the partnership trustee may be devoted in
large part to the payment of those administrative expenses.
Section 5f of the Bankruptcy Act required administrative expenses
to be paid from the partnership property and the individual property in
such proportions as the court should determine. This provision was part
of a statutory scheme that made the trustee elected by the creditors of
the partnership the trustee of the separate estate of each debtor being
jointly administered." While joint administration may still be authorized
pursuant to Rules 117 and 210 of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure,82
the clear implication of the statute is that the expenses of adminstration
of the partnership estate are not to be imposed on the partner's estate.
At the same time it is to be emphasized that administration of the part-
ner's estate is now for the benefit of the partnership creditors as well as
the partner's creditors. Except when a single trustee serves both
estates, apportionment of administrative expenses between the estates
should not be necessary; ie., the expenses incurred in the administration
of each. debtor's estate should be identifiable and charged accordingly
without apportionment.
B. Independent Administration of the Partner's Estate
1. Dual Claims Against the Partnership and the Partner's Estate
If the partner, but not the partnership, is a debtor under the
Bankruptcy Code, may the partnership creditor holding a partner's per-
sonal obligation file two claims? This question arose under the Bank-
ruptcy Act, and the solution was to apply the jingle rule as if the
creditor had two different claims. The partnership creditor was allowed
to share in the distribution of the partner's estate with other separate
creditors of the partner to the extent he held the personal obligation of
the partner.' The partnership creditor who had no claim against the
partner was thus at a significant disadvantage in the administration of
the partner's estate as compared with the position of the partnership
creditor who had obtained the separate obligation of the partner. The
elimination by the Bankruptcy Code of this disadvantage undermines
any justification for dual filing against the partner's estate. The partner-
ship creditors of course retain their right to resort to the partnership
See FED. R. BANK. P. 210(e) (superseding but'incorporating the substance of the
first sentence of § 5c of the Bankruptcy Act).
" See FED. R. BANK. P. 117 & 210. Proposed Bankruptcy Rule 1015(b) tracks current
Rule 117(b), and proposed Rule 2009(e) tracks current Rule 210(e).
See 1A W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 5.35, at 751-52 n.8 (14th ed. 1962); F. MECHEM,
supra note 4, § 458.
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property for the unpaid balances of their claims, free of any competition
by the separate creditors of the partners. While section 723 does not
purport to deal with the distribution of a partner's estate when there is
no-concurrent administration of the partnership estate, the inequity of
allowing two bites at the apple by a creditor who has a single claim is too
patent to be seriously entertained. Confining the partnership creditor to
his claim in that capacity and disallowing his claim as a separate creditor
will tend to harmonize the result in the situations when the partnership
estate is b6ing administered concurrently and when it is not.
2. The Secured Claim of a Partnership Creditor
If a partner, but not the partnership, is a debtor under Chapter 7, a
partnership creditor who has obtained the partner's personal obligation
may nevertheless prefer to file or enforce his claim as a separate
creditor. Thus, he may be secured by the partner's separate property
but be unsecured as a partnership creditor. Should he be entitled to file
as an unsecured partnership creditor without diminution on account of
his security in the partner's estate? It is submitted that, as when the
partner's and partnership estates are being administered concurrently,'
the allowable unsecured claim should be reduced to the extent of the
value of the security. It would be anomalous for his entire claim to be
allowed as unsecured and for the same claim to be allowed as secured by
the property of the partner's estate. On the other hand, if the partner-
ship creditor has security only in the property of the partnership, it ap-
pears that he may claim as an unsecured creditor of the partner,
whether or not he has obtained a separate obligation of the partner.
What rule applies if the partnership creditor is secured by property
of both the partnership and the partner? A logical application of the
rules just stated would require reduction of the allowable claim against
the partner's estate only to the extent of the security held in the part-
ner's estate. 5 The solutions here suggested are consonant with the ob-
jective of harmonizing the treatment of partnership creditors' and
separate creditors' claims in the administration of partners' estates, ir-
respective of whetlier their partnership's estate is being concurrently
administered. Inequities, confusion, and needless litigation should be
reduced to the extent the distributive rights of the creditors of partner-
ship and the partners' estates can be assimilated, whether the estates of
their debtors are concurrently administered under the Bankruptcy Code
or only one of the estates is being administered.
3. Priority Claims of Partnership Creditors
When a partner, but not the partnership, is a debtor under the
Bankruptcy Code, does a partnership creditor entitled to priority as an




employee, consumer-depositor, or tax claimant have the same priority in
the distribution of the partner's estate as he would have in the distribu-
tion of the partnership estate? The answer should be the same as that
given when the partnership creditors' claims are pre-empted by the
trustee of the partnership during the course of concurrent administra-
tion." The creditors entitled to priority under the several paragraphs of
section 507(a) should have the relation to the debtor defined in these
paragraphs. The conclusion that the Bankruptcy Code authorizes part-
nership creditors to file claims against the partner's estate falls con-
siderably short of merging the identity of the partner with that of the
partnership or eliminating differences between the rights of partnership
and partners' creditors to share in distribution from the partner's
estate.
7
C. The Partnership as a Creditor of the Partner's Estate
May the partnership file a claim against a partner's estate?
Although the first clause of section 5h of the Bankruptcy Act declared
that the court could permit the proof of the claim of the partnership
estate against the individual estates,' the occasions for applying this
provision were rare. The undoubted reason for this paucity of case law
was that the jingle rule required application of the separate estate to the
payment of separate creditors' claims in full before the partnership's
creditors were entitled to share in the separate partner's estate, and the
partnership was viewed as having no better standing to compete with
separate creditors than the partnership creditors. Section 40(a)(II) of the
Uniform Partnership Act includes as an asset of the partnership the con-
tributions of the partners necessary for the payment of all the liabilities
of the partnership. 9 The right of a partnership to contribution under sec-
tion 40(a)(II) of the Uniform Partnership Act fits easily within the broad
See supra text accompanying notes 75-78.
The statement in the text is believed to be correct although-the legislative reports
declare that when the partnership and a partner are both debtors under the Bankruptcy
Code, the partnership trustee will share equally with the partners' individual creditors in
the assets of the partner's estate. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 381, 1978 U. S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6337; SEN. REPORT, supra note 12, at 95, 1978 U. S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5881. The legislative history does not concern a case where there is no partnership
trustee, but arguably the presence of the trustee should make no difference. If priority
were accorded to a partnership creditor in the distribution of a partner's estate by virtue of
the creditor's status as an employee or a consumer debtor or tax obligor of the partnership
rather than of the partner, the result would be a distortion of the distribution scheme of the
Bankruptcy Code. The jingle rule would not have been merely repealed; it would have been
turned on its head at the expense of separate creditors of the partner's estate.
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
This provision seems to have been regarded in the legislative history of the
Bankruptcy Code as a prime basis for recognizing the general partner's liability for partner-
ship debts. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 198, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
6158-59.
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definition of a claim in section" 101(4)."' Section 541(a)(3) provides that
"any interest in property" recovered by the trustee under section 723 is
property of the estate, and section 704(1) continues the statutory duty of
the trustee to collect the property of the estate." When the partnership
and the partner are both debtors in cases under the Bankruptcy Code,
the trustee of the partnership has a claim against the partner's estate
under section 723(c) for the full amount of the allowed claims of the
creditors of the partnership. This provision is not and should not be ex-
clusive of the right of the trustee to assert a claim for contribution or in-
demnity against the partner's estate, particularly if the partnership has
paid all or the bulk of the partnership creditors' claim.
Since the abolition of the jingle rule permits the partnership
creditors to compete pari passu with the separate creditors in a Chapter
7 case, it should enable the partnership to share on the same basis with
the separate creditors to the extent that the firm, having paid the part-
nership creditors, is entitled to contribution from the partner on account
of the payment. On the other hand, if some partnership creditors remain
unpaid, the partnership as the primary obligor of the partnership
creditors should not be able to compete pari passu with the partnership
creditors. An equitable solution in such a situation would permit the
partnership nonetheless to file its claim for contribution against the
partner's estate but would require any distribution to the partnership on
its claim to be applied to the payment of claims of creditors of the part-
nership. 2 Any surplus remaining after payment of the partnership
"' See supra note 48 (definition of "claim" in § 101(4) of the Bankruptcy Code).
9 Section 704(1) directs the trustee to "collect and reduce to money the property of the
estate for which the trustee serves." Under § 723 the trustee may recover the deficiency of
the property of the partnership to pay in full the allowed claims of the partnership creditors
from each partner's estate, but the partnership trustee is directed "[t]o the extent prac-
ticable," to seek recovery from any general partner whose estate is not being administered
in a case under the Bankruptcy Code. When a partner and the partnership are both debtors
under the Bankruptcy Code, however, § 723(c) gives the partnership trustee no option
respecting the pursuit of the partnership creditors' claims against the partner's estate. The
partnership trustee's aggregate claim is automatically filed and allowed and entitled to a
distribution without delay. This claim is not subject to reduction as a result of successful
pursuit by the partnership trustee of the amount of the deficiency in the partnership estate
referred to in § 723(a) & (b); nor is the claim subject to enlargement by virtue of a failure on
the part of the partnership trustee to realize on any of the assets of the partnership estate,
including the rights of recovery against nondebtor partners.
The right to recover a deficiency under § 723(a) or (b) or to receive a distribution under
§ 723(c) is apparently not included as property of the partnership estate under § 541(a)(3),
but once recovery is effected, the proceeds become part of the estate. The dichotomy be-
tween the right to the recovery and the proceeds of the recovery does not appear to be
significant for present purposes.
92 Thus, suppose that there is $1000 in a partner's estate for distribution and that the
claims against the estate include $1000 due a separate creditor of the partner, $500 due a
partnership creditor, and $500 due the partnership by virtue of its payment of partnership
creditors. The separate creditor and the partnership creditor would each receive $500, the
$250 allocable to the partnership being distributed to the partnership creditor. This
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creditors out of the distribution to the partnership should be
redistributed to the members of the partnership in accordance with the
equities, determined in the light of the partnership agreement and the
partners' contributions to the payment of the partnership creditors. The
right of the partnership or its trustee to file a claim for contribution
against the partner's estate should not depend on whether the estates
are being concurrently administered.
D. A Copartner's Claim
A partner may also be entitled to contribution from a copartner by
virtue of a payment or transfer to partnership creditors. 3 Such a right
fits easily within the definition of a claim. 4 It should be subject to the or-
dinary rules governing filing and allowance of claims, but, like a similar
claim of the partnership,95 a claim of a partner for contribution should be
postponed after payment to partnership creditors. If unpaid partner-
ship creditors and a partner seeking contribution file claims against the
estate of a copartner, the court should be assured that the distribution
allocable to the claimant partner is applied to the satisfaction of unpaid
creditors of the partnership. Any surplus remaining after such applica-
tion may be retained by the partner entitled to the contribution.
E. The Partner as a Chapter 11 Debtor
If a partner is a debtor in a Chapter 11 case, the schedules filed by
the debtor or the trustee serve as a substitute for the filing of claims by
creditors except those who have disputed, contingent, or unliquidated
claims. Unless excepted, the claim as scheduled is deemed filed under
section 1111(a) and allowed under section 502(a). The debtor or the
distribution would be generally consonant with treatment of the partnership as a codebtor
under §§ 501(b) and 509(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. For reasons suggested in note 135 infra,
however, it is inappropriate to assume or construe the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code
that refer to codebtors to be directly applicable to partners, either in their relationship to
the partnership or to each other. Conventional suretyship law has recognized that a retiring
partner who obtains a promise on the part of the partners remaining in the partnership to
assume partnership obligations is a surety in respect to those obligations. See RESTATE-
MENT OF SECURITY § 83, comment d, and § 104, comment g (1941); L. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP 210 (1950); LINDLEY ON PARTNERSHIP 269 (E. Scamell ed. 13th ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as LINDLEY ON PARTNERSHIP]. The rules of law governing partner-
ship and suretyship have otherwise generally developed independently of each other. Con-
trary to the suggestions in 124 CONG. REC. 32398 and 32401 (Sept. 28, 1978) and 124 CONG.
REC. 33998 and 34001 (Oct. 5, 1978), the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act applicable to
codebtors and sureties were not applied to the relationship of a partner to the partnership
of which he was a member.
' See F. MECHEM, supra note 4, § 187; LINDLEY ON PARTNERSHIP, supra note 92, at 390.
u See supra note 48.
9 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 40(i)(III).
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trustee may and ordinarily should schedule the claims of the partnership
and the separate creditors in the same way.' Although they may be
classified separately for the purpose of a reorganization plan, there is
nothing in Chapter 11 to require or warrant preferential treatment of
either class in the distribution of a partner's estate. Preferential treat-
ment of partnership creditors would be vulnerable to objection as un-
fairly discriminatory within the contemplation of section 1129(b)(1) in the
light of what has traditionally been regarded as equitable treatment of
separate creditors. Preferential treatment of separate creditors may be
justified as permissible in light of the failure of the Bankruptcy Code to
negate continuing applicability of the jingle rule in the situation
presented, but the burden may plausibly be placed on the proponent to
justify differentiating treatment to creditors whom section 723 treats as
similar.98 The right of the partnership to contribution from the partner's
estate, for the reason indicated above,99 should be subordinated to the
claims of the unpaid partnership creditors but need not be subordinated
to claims of separate creditors. The partnership claim may be scheduled
and allowed along with the claims of creditors of the partnership as well
as the separate claims of the creditors of the partner. No prejudice need
accrue to the rights of the partnership creditors if the distributions
allocable to the partnership are applied to the unpaid claims of partner-
ship creditors.
IV. TAX CLAIMS
There are two federal sources of tax law applicable to a partnership
or a partner who becomes a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code.' 0 The
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 contains special tax provisions limited
primarily to state and local tax consequences of becoming a debtor under
the Code.'"' Consideration of federal tax consequences was postponed
until the next Congress, when the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 198002 was
" Section 1122(a) of the Bankruptcy Code requires all claims in a particular class in a
plan to be substantially similar to the other claims of the class but does not require all
substantially similar claims to be in the same class. While the section may carry an implica-
tion that separate classification of different kinds of claims is the norm, inclusion of all
unsecured creditors having the same priority in a single class minimizes litigation of the
fairness of the classification and permits administrative economy.
" As indicated in the in text accompanying note 14 supra, § 723 does not apply directly
in a Chapter 11 case, and accordingly the jingle rule arguably constitutes no constraint on
the formulation of any Chapter 11 plan. So long as each holder of a claim is receiving as
much as would be received in a liquidation of the partner's estate under Chapter 7, the stan-
dard of § 1129(a)(7) is complied with.
See supra text accompanying note 92.
See Thompson & Tenney, Partnership Bankruptcy-The New Entity and In-
dividual Tax Consequences, 35 TAx LAw. 89 (1981).
101 See, e.g., §§ 346, 728, and 1146 of the Bankruptcy Code.
"o See Pub. L. No. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3389 (1980).
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passed. Despite differences in focus, the two Acts provide consistent
rules for administering the tax affairs of partners and partnerships in
bankruptcy.
When a partnership is a debtor in a voluntary or involuntary case,
the Bankruptcy Code provides that any state or local income tax im-
posed on the partnership continues to apply to the estate of the partner-
ship as if no petition had been filed."°3 Similarly with respect to federal
income taxes, the-Internal Revenue Code now directs that "no separate
taxable entity shall result from the commencement of a case under Title
11" in which a partnership is the debtor.'
In contrast, when an individual partner is a debtor under Chapter 7
or 11, the Bankruptcy Code makes his estate a separate taxable entity20
Any income of the partner's estate is taxable under state .or local law
only to the estate and not the partner. Thus any gain or loss resulting
from a distribution of partnership property, and any distributive share
of income, gain, loss, deduction or credit distributed after commence-
ment of the partner's case, is attributed to the partner's estate."0 With
respect to federal taxes, the Internal Revenue Code implicitly
recognizes the existence of two taxable entities when it .specifies that
upon the transfer of an individual debtor's assets to his estate, -"the
estate shall be treated as the debtor would be treated."
1 7
While consistent in administrative procedure, the Bankruptcy Code
and the Internal Revenue Code appear to be inconsistent in providing
rules for the allowance and distribution of tax claims against a partner's
distributive share of partnership income not withdrawn from the part-
nership. Outside of bankruptcy, such retained income is taxed as income
of the partner, both under federal tax law and under state revenue codes
"o See § 346(c)(1). The trustee of the partnership is required by §§ 346(c)(2) and 728(b) to
make any tax return that state or local law requires of the partnership. Section 728(b) ex-
cuses the trustee of an individual or a corporation in a case under Chapter 7 from any duty
to file an income tax return if the debtor does have a net taxable income for the entire
period after entry of the order for relief in the case. The excuse does not apply to the
trustee for a partnership in such a case.
I0- I.R.C. § 1399 (1976), as amended by Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-589,
§ 3, 94 Stat. 3389, 3400-01 (1980). Heretofore, the Internal Revenue Service treated the
estate of a bankrupt partnership as a separate taxable entity. See Rev. Rul. 68-48, 1968-1
C.B. 301. Section 1399 does not apply to any case to which I.R.C. § 1398 applies. Section
1398, also amended by § 3 of the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, applies to any case under
Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 in which an individual is the debtor. See I.R.C. § 1398 (1976), as
amended'by Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-589, § 3, 94 Stat. 3389, 3397 (1980).
"'. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 276, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6232-33
(citing §§ 346(b)(1), 728(a), and 1146(a) of the Bankruptcy Code).
106 See § 346(b)(1). Prior law was silent on this issue, and § 346(b)(1) is thus clarifying
rather than operative to shift any tax incidence. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 279,
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6236-37.
"' I.R.C. § 1398(f)(1) (1976). Section 346(g) of the Bankruptcy Code is to the same effect,
but the Internal Revenue Code's § 1398(f)(1) is nonetheless reassuring in light of the "sub-
ject to the Internal Revenue Code" proviso in § 346(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.
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which follow the federal approach to partnership taxation. 8 Tax claims
against this income would be claims against the partner's estate. Thus a
taxing authority that attempts to satisfy its claim against partnership
assets, including the retained income, would be subordinated to partner-
ship creditors." 9
The Bankruptcy Code prevents this result with respect to state or
local taxes. When the partner and his partnership are both debtors in
separate cases under Chapter 7,110 any state or local tax liability of a
partner for retained earnings gives rise to "a claim only against such
partnership."''
There is no comparable provision in the Bankruptcy Tax Reform
Act. That Act makes no distinction between retained and distributed
earnings in providing that "the interest in a partnership of a debtor who
is an individual shall be taken into account ... in the same manner as any
other interest of the debtor."' . By defining the gross income of an in-
dividual debtor's estate to include "gross income of the debtor to which
the estate is entitled,""' the Act suggests that a claim for federal taxes
on retained income is a claim against the partner's estate and thus
subordinated to partnership creditors when asserted against partner-
ship assets. This result was avoided under the Bankruptcy Act by a
resort to equity in In re Brezin.'" The federal tax claim was called an
equitable lien on the partnership estate's retained earnings and was
thereby allowed priority in the distribution of partnership assets. When
the Commission of Bankruptcy Laws proposed the retained earnings
provision now embodied in section 728(c) of the Bankruptcy Code with
respect to state or local tax claims, it had in mind the codification of this
equitable solution.' While that is the effect of the Bankruptcy Code's
state or local tax claim provision, there is no basis for inferring that the
drafters of the Bankruptcy Tax Reform Act intended the same result
"1 See I.R.C. § 702(c) (1976).
'" See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
"' The provision of § 728(c) converting the partner's tax liability into one against the
partnership does not apply when either the partnership or the partner alone is a debtor in a
case under title 11, or even when both the partnership and partner are debtors in concur-
rently pending cases, one of which is a Chapter 11 case.
.,. The "only" language is curious, since the partnership trustee has a claim against the
estate of any debtor-partner for the taxes due under § 723(c), which applies notwithstanding
§ 728(c). See infra note 119 and accompanying text. The legislative reports advise tax collec-
tors that "[n]o burden is placed on the taxing authority: the taxing authority should file a
complete proof of claim in each case and the court will execute the marshalling." HousE
REPORT, supra note 12, at 386, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6342; SEN. REPORT, supra
note 12, at 100, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5886.
III I.R.C. § 1398(b)(2) (1976).
" I.R.C. § 1398(e)(1) (1976).
11. 297 F. 300, 306 (D. N.H. 1924).
' The provision is derived from § 5-104(d) of the Bankruptcy Act proposed by the
Commission of the Bankruptcy Laws. See COMMISSION REPORT II, supra note 9, at 187-88.
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with respect to federal tax claims. Moreover, the Supreme Court re-
frained from endorsing the equitable solution in United States v. Kauf-
man."' Thus the question of the allowance and distribution of federal tax
claims for retained earnings is apparently left in limbo.
The legislative history of section 728(c), containing the provision that
pertains to state or local tax claims for retained earnings, suggests the
likely, though arguably irrelevant, view of the Code drafters on the
federal tax question. The legislative reports characterized the provision
as "a marshalling rule only for purposes of allowance and distribution."'' 7
There is no reason to believe that the drafters supposed that such a rule
should differentiate between federal and nonfederal tax claims.
However, the relevant legislative reports are confusing in their ex-
planations of the role of section 728(c). According to these reports, if
partnership assets are insufficient to satisfy partnership debts, section
723(c) will "allow any unsatisfied tax claim to be asserted by the partner-
ship trustee against the estate of the partner,""' 8 notwithstanding the ap-
parently exclusive rule of section 728(c). This statement ignored the full
reach of section 723(c), which gives the trustee a claim against the part-
ner's estate "for the full amount" of the tax claim and which applies "not-
withstanding section 728(c).""' It is irrelevant for the purposes of section
723(c) whether or not the partnership estate suffices to pay partnership
debts. The legislative history suggested that an effort was made to retain
one branch of the jingle rule for state or local tax claims against retained
earnings by requiring that the claims be satisifed from partnership assets
first. Clearly, however, the language of the Code does not accommodate
such an exception for tax claims.
The legislative history of section 728(c) concluded with the equivocal
observation that, as a result of section 723(c), "the tax claim may be non-
dischargeable with respect to an individual partner.""' This statement is
consistent with the characterization of section 728(c) as "a marshalling
rule only," but the subsection as enacted contains no intimation that it
has such a limited purpose. There is no attempt to provide for or against
the nondischargeability of such a tax claim in section 523.
267 U.S. 408 (1925).
II HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 386, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6342; SEN.
REPORT, supra note 12, at 100, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5886.
' Id. (emphasis added).
' Similarly confusing is the statement in the HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 280,
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6237, that if the partnership estate does not satisfy the
claim of the partnership creditors, § 723(c) permits the partnership trustee to file a claim
against the partner's estate for the deficit. The passage fails to recognize that the partner-
ship trustee's claim against the partner's estate under this subsection is "for the full
amount" of the tax claim. Moreover, it fails to recognize that § 723(c) does not merely permit
the partnership trustee to file a claim but establishes such a claim as a matter of right.
"2 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 386, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6342; SEN.
REPORT, supra note 12, at 100, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5886.
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V. SETOFF
The Bankruptcy Code modifies the right of setoff but generally con-
tinues the traditional policy of recognizing the right,'21 notwithstanding
the resulting impairment of the theme of equality of distribution. The
new law in several respects treats the creditor with a right of setoff as a
species of secured creditor."' 2
One of the prime requisites for application of setoff is that the debts
and credits be mutual.'3 If a partnership debtor in a case under the
Bankruptcy Code has a claim against a partner, may the debtor of the
partnership set off a separate claim he has against a copartner? Since
the partner's creditor has no claim against the partnership but only a
claim against the partner's share of a surplus if one materializes, there is
no mutuality.'24 Accordingly, setoff is not permitted.
If, on the other hand, a partner has a claim against an obligor who
has a claim against the partnership, mutuality appears to be present.
The creditor of the partnership is entitled to compete pari passu with
the partner's creditors in the distribution of the separate property of the
partner.'25 No greater inequity results from allowing the partnership
creditor to enforce its claim against the asset represented by the part-
ner's claim than from allowing a separate creditor of the partner to
assert the setoff. Recognition of the right of setoff in this situation
arguably represents a change of the law, since allowance of the setoff to
the partnership creditor gives him the right of a secured creditor in the
partner's estate in contravention of the former right of the separate
creditors to have the separate property devoted first to the payment of
the separate debts. The separate creditors' right to first payment under
the Bankruptcy Act seems to have been disregarded in Rochelle v.
United States,2 ' which allowed setoff in such a situation, but the result
is consistent with that called for by the new law.
I" The principal section governing setoff in the Bankruptcy Code is § 553. It incor-
porates most of the features of § 68 of the Bankruptcy Act.
"= Section 506(a), which governs the determination of "secured status," recognizes a
claim subject to setoff under § 553 as a secured claim.
"I The requirement of mutuality is explicit in § 553(a) as it was in § 68a of the
Bankruptcy Act.
"2 To allow setoff in this situation would be to appropriate property of the partnership,
in which the other partner has an interest, to the payment of one partner's debt. The effect
is thus to take the other partner's share of the partnership claim for the benefit of the part-
ner who is the only obligor without the consent of the other partner. The other partner may
properly object to the setoff, whether the obligor of the partnership is seeking the setoff, as
in In re T.M. Lesher & Son, 176 F. 650 (E.D. Pa. 1910), and In re Crystal Spring Bottling Co.,
100 F. 265 (D. Vt. 1900), or the partner is seeking to pay his debt out of the partnership
claim, as in Gray v. Rollo, 85 U.S. 629 (1873).
,25 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
'2 521 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976), mandate amended on
rehearing, 526 F.2d 405 (1976). The Rochelle court correctly pointed out that in this situa-
tion the other partner has no right to object because he is giving up nothing, the partner-
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VI. ADJUSTMENTS ON ACCOUNT OF DISTRIBUTIONS FROM
MORE THAN ONE ESTATE OR SOURCE
If a partnership is a debtor in a case under Chapter 7, the trustee of
the partnership is authorized to seek collection of the partnership's
debts from any partner-member of the partnership who is not a debtor
under the Bankruptcy Code, but that authorization is conditioned on the
existence of a deficiency of the partnership property to pay those debts
and the costs of administration of the partnership estate.11 If the
bankruptcy court in which the partnership case is pending does not en-
join the partners from disposing of their property,1" a partner-member
may pay some or all of the partnership debts. Moreover, if the trustee of
the partnership does not obtain an injunction against collection by part-
nership creditors out of a partner's property,129 one or more of such
creditors may sue a partner to judgment and obtain forcible collection
out of the partner's property by levy and execution sale. As a result of
such a payment or collection the partnership creditor may receive full
payment of his debt or at least more than other partnership creditors of
the same class. 30
Section 508(b) of the Bankruptcy Code recognizes this possibility as a
source of inequity among partnership creditors and attempts to
ameliorate it under certain circumstances. If the partnership creditor
receiving the payment is not secured by a lien on property of the part-
ner, the creditor is precluded from receiving any distribution from the
partnership estate until other creditors of the same class have "received
payment under this title equal in value to the consideration received by
ship creditor asserting the setoff is in no position to object to his own choice of obligor, and
the partner against whom the setoff is asserted cannot object to being held liable to the
partnership creditor. What the court ignored, however, was the frustration of the policy of
the Bankruptcy Act to give the separate creditors of a partner the right to have the part-
ner's assets devoted first to the payment of their claims before the partnership creditors
could participate in any distribution of the proceeds from these assets. The court
acknowledged that In re Phoenix Hotel Co. of Lexington, Ky., 20 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. Ky.
1937), was contra but found its reasons unpersuasive. See 521 F.2d at 854.
'" See § 723(a). If any partner-member is a debtor in a case under the Bankruptcy
Code, the trustee of the partnership has an automatic claim against the partner's estate.
See § 723(c); supra text accompanying notes 61-73.
' See § 723(b).
', See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 198, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6159.
Issuance of an injunction may be predicated on 11 U.S.C. § 105 (Supp. IV 1980) and 28 U.S.C.
1481 (Supp. IV 1980). The automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362 (Supp. IV 1980) triggered by the
filing of a petition concerning a partnership does not reach proceedings and acts to collect
from the partners.
"I. The word "class," as used here and subsequently in the text, includes all those
creditors who are entitled to receive distribution from the estate at the same rate if there is
not enough to pay them in full. This usage is believed to be consistent with the congres-
sional intent when the word "class" is used in the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., §§ 1122(a),
1123(a)(4) (requiring "same treatment for each claim or interest of a particular class"), and
§ 1322(a)(3) (requiring "the same treatment for each claim within a particular class").
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such creditor from such general partner." Section 508(a) contains a
similar provision requiring equalization of distribution when a creditor
of a debtor in a case under the Bankruptcy Code receives payment pur-
suant to a distribution in a foreign proceeding."' These provisions are
not well drafted and undoubtedly should be read to suspend distribution
to the creditor receiving payment from the outside source only until the
other creditors have received a distribution of proportionate or pro
rated value from the estate rather than one equal in value to the con-
sideration received from the outside source. Thus, if a partnership
creditor receives $1,000 from a partner, constituting fifty percent of the
creditor's claim, the intent of the statute is that the creditor should
receive no distribution from the partnership estate until other creditors
of the same class have received, not $1,000, but fifty percent of their
respective claims from the partnership estate.
Section 508 is clear that a transfer of property in discharge of a
claim by a creditor as well as a payment in money triggers the suspen-
,s, "Section 508b of the House amendment is new and provides an identical rule with
respect to a creditor of a partnership who receives payment from a partner, to that of a
creditor of a debtor who receives a payment in a foreign proceeding involving the debtor."
124 CONG. REC. 32398 (Sept. 28, 1978) (Congressman Edwards' statement); 124 CONG. REC.
33997 (Oct. 5, 1978) (Senator DeConcini's statement).
Section 508(a) is an adaptation of § 65d of the Bankruptcy Act. Section 65d dealt with
potential problems arising from dual bankruptcies in this and another country by requiring
those creditors for whom no foreign dividend had been paid or declared to receive from the
bankruptcy court in this country a dividend equal to whatever had been paid or declared
abroad in favor of creditors of the same class before the latter group should receive any
amount from a distribution by the court in this country. Section 65d, which was part of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 as originally enacted, was amended in 1952 to make clear that
distribution to a creditor for whom a dividend has been declared though not yet paid should
be suspended until other creditors of the same class had been paid an equal dividend in the
case pending in this country. See H.R. REP. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in
1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1960; Nadelmann, Revision of Conflicts Provisions in the
American Bankruptcy Act, 1 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 484, 487-88 (1952), reprinted in 27 REF. J.
53, 54 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Nadelmann].
The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States recommended a con-
tinuation and extension of the policy of what has been called the hotchpot rule to cover not
only cases of concurrent bankruptcies but also cases in which rehabilitation was the objec-
tive in either or both of the concurrent proceedings. See COMMISSION REPORT H, supra note
9, at 111, 114-15. The Commission's proposal also contemplated equalization when any
postpetition payment reducing a creditor's claim came from funds located outside the country.
As enacted, § 508 does not require equalization unless a creditor has received "in a
foreign proceedings, payment of, or a transfer of property on account of, a claim that is
allowed under this title." A "foreign proceeding" is defined in § 101(19) to include a pro-
ceeding for adjusting debts or effecting a reorganization as well as liquidating an estate.
Professor Nadelmann has pointed out that the hotchpot rule underlying former § 65d of
the Bankruptcy Act and § 508(a) of the Bankruptcy Code has long been applied in England,
France, and other, but not all, European countries, and that it may well be regarded as part
of the common law as applied in the United States. See Nadelmann, supra, at 487, 27 REF. J.
at 54; Nadelmann, The National Bankruptcy Act and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARV. L. REV.
1025, 1048-49 (1946), reprinted in 21 REF. J. 43, 51 (1947).
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sion of distribution to the creditor in the case under the Bankruptcy
Code. A transfer by way of security is presumably to be given the same
effect as a payment or transfer in satisfaction of the claim.1" Otherwise
the partnership creditor would avoid the effect of the section by accept-
ing or taking a lien on the partner's property rather than an outright
payment or transfer. On the other hand, if the creditor is already
secured by a lien on the property of the partner, no suspension. or
equalizing adjustment is required by a partner's payment or transfer on
account of the secured claim." This limitation placed on the applicability
" "Transfer" is defined in § 101(40) of the Bankruptcy Code to include any voluntary or
involuntary disposition of or parting with an interest in property. While the declaration of a
dividend abroad triggered the suspension of dividend payments to a creditor under § 65d of
the Bankruptcy Act, see supra note 131, it may be doubted whether such a declaration con-
stitutes either a payment or transfer of property within § 508(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.
"= It is to be noted that, so far as the language of the relevant clause of § 508(b) in-
dicates, the lien on the property of the debtor may be a consensual, judicial, statutory,
equitable, or common-law lien; may have arisen before or after the filing of the petition con-
cerning the partnership; and may even be unperfected, preferential, or voidable for an other
reason under bankruptcy or nonbankruptcy law.
Arguably, payments are not suspended if the partnership creditor is secured in an
amount insufficient to cover the claim on account of which the payment or transfer is made
and although the payment or transfer exceeds the value of the security. The argument is
not ineluctable, however, and may be met by recurring to § 506(a), which separates an
undersecured claim into two claims for the purpose of allowance: the secured claim is
limited "to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such
property," and the rest of the claim is an unsecured claim. Section 506(a) does not apply
directly to the situation under consideration, because the partnership estate does not or-
dinarily include interests in the property of the partner. The analogy of § 506(a) is clear,
however, as is the well-established rule that a payment or transfer to a creditor on the eve
of bankruptcy is not voidable as a preference to the extent the creditor is secured. See Ken-
nedy, The Inchoate Lien in Bankruptcy: Some Reflections on Rialto Publishing Co. v. Bass,
17 STAN. L. REv. 793 (1965). Undoubtedly, Congress intended to except from the operation
of § 508(b) a payment or transfer on account of a claim only to the extent it is validly
secured.
The intention to include every type of lien in the clause of § 508(b) under consideration
was deliberate and is, in itself, no cause for criticism. The Bankruptcy Code defines "lien"
broadly in § 101(28) and adds more particular definitions of "judicial lien" in § 101(27) and
"statutory lien" in § 101(38). A "security interest" is limited by § 101(37) to a consensual lien.
The statute does not define an "equitable lien" or a "common-law lien," but these varieties
of liens are embraced by the language of § 101(28).
The undoubted intent of Congress in § 508(b) was to refer to alien arising before the fil-
ing of the petition. If, as suggested in the text, a postpetition lien triggers the suspension of
distribution, the lien that excludes a postpetition payment or transfer from the operation of
the subsection is necessarily one that arose before the petition. If, on a contrary assumption
as to the meaning of "transfer" in § 508(a), a payment or transfer in satisfaction of a
postpetition lien would avoid the operation of the suspension of distribution otherwise
prescribed by § 508(b), an easy way to circumvention of its effect would be afforded by the
simple stratagem of creating a lien before making a payment or absolute transfer.
It will not be so easy for the trustee of the partnership to avoid the exclusionary effect
of § 508(b) by challenging the validity of the lien. As pointed out in text accompanying note
136 infra, the trustee of the partnership is not supposed to have any powers of avoidance
under the Bankruptcy Code respecting the property of the partners.
19831
88 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
of the suspension of payments is consistent with the rule implicit in the
partnership provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that a lien on a partner's
property securing a partnership debt does not reduce the allowable
claim of the creditor against the partnership estate." If a partner should
pay a partnership creditor out of his separate property before the filing
of the petition concerning the partnership, the payment reduces pro
tanto the creditor's claim against the partnership estate."3 5 If so, and if a
13 See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
13 Under nonbankruptcy law a prepetition payment of a partnership debt by a partner
discharges the debt pro tanto so far as the creditor and all third persons are concerned.
"The partnership must indemnify every partner in respect of payments made and personal
liabilities reasonably incurred by him in the ordinary and proper conduct of its business, or
for the preservation of its business or property." UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(b). This
right to indemnification is sometimes referred to as subrogation, contribution, or reimburse-
ment, but it is enforceable only internally, typically by an accounting at dissolution. See J.
CRANE & A. BROMBERG, supra note 6, at 371-73. The claim of the creditor who has been paid
by the partner is not kept alive for the purpose of enabling the partner to compete with un-
paid creditors of the partnership in a settlement of the affairs of the partnership. The part-
ner who paid the partnership debt may or may not be entitled to indemnification by the
partnership, depending on the partnership agreement and circumstances having nothing to
do with the amount and the rights of the partnership creditor vis-a-vis the partnership. See
Comment, 9 ILL. L. REV. 52 (1914).
The partner's relation to the partnership is thus not identical to that-of a surety, whose
partial payment of a debt before the bankruptcy of the principal debtor does not discharge
the debt. The creditor who has received the partial payment, or the surety in his behalf,
may file a claim undiminished by the payment, because the principal debtor's estate remains
liable for the full amount of the debt. See §§ 501(b), 509(a); FED. R. BANKR. P. 304 and Ad-
visory Committee Note; Proposed Bankruptcy Rule 3005(a). In order to protect the estate
against the risk of double payment on what is essentially a single claim, only a single claim
may be filed.
While a surety may file a proof of claim as a codebtor under § 501(b), a partner will not
ordinarily be warranted in filing a claim as such a codebtor of the partnership. Cf. supra
text accompanying notes 56-59. Gratuitous comments in the Congressional Record sug-
gesting that "sections of the Bankruptcy Act [sic] applying to codebtors and sureties apply
to the relationship of a partner with respect to a partnership debtor" must be taken with
considerable qualification. See 124 CONG. REc. 32401 (Sept. 28, 1978); 124 CONG. REc. 34001
(Oct. 5, 1978); supra note 60.
Section 509(b) contains exceptions to the general rule recognized in § 509(a) that a surety
or other codebtor who pays a claim against a debtor is subrogated to the creditor's claim.
One of the exceptions bars subrogation to the extent that the codebtor received the con-
sideration for the claim held by the creditor. Statements in the Congressional Record ex-
plain that "Section 509(b)(2) reiterates the well-known rule that prevents a debtor that is
ultimately liable on the debt from recovering from a surety or a co-debtor." 124 CONG. REC.
32398 (Sept. 28, 1978) (Congressman Edwards' statement); 124 CONG. REC. 33998 (Oct. 5,
1978) (Senator DeConcini's statement). Similar statutory language appears in § 1301(c)(1),
and is similarly explained in the Congressional Record as an effort to state an exception ap-
plicable to the party who ultimately bears the liability as between two codebtors. See Ken-
nedy, Automatic Stays Under the New Bankruptcy Law, 12 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 1, 55-56
(1978). The party receiving the consideration is, of course, not necessarily the ultimately
liable party, as the legislative history accompanying both passages acknowledges. See 124
CONG. REC. 32398, 32409, 33998, and 34009 (1978).
Added to this gloss on § 509(b)(2), however, is the following unilluminating reference to
partners:
Although the language in section 509(b)(2) foduses in terms of receipt of considera-
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postpetition payment or transfer to the partnership creditor triggers
suspension of distribution to the creditor favored by the transfer pend-
ing equalization of dividend payments, it is not readily apparent why a
prepetition payment or lien, particularly one received or obtained on the
eve of the filing of the petition, should be ignored in the equalization
process. The House Report accompanying H.R. 8200 declared, however,
that the avoiding powers of a partnership trustee do not reach transfers
of a partner's property.13 The thrust toward achieving equality in sec-
tion 508(b) is not easily reconcilable with the conceptualization of the
relation between the partnership creditors and the partner's estate in
the House Report.
VII. DISTRIBUTION OF SURPLUS
Under the Bankruptcy Act the disposition of a surplus remaining
after the administration of a partnership estate was a fairly simple mat-
ter. The third sentence of section 5g stated the applicable rule as
follows:
Should any surplus of the partnership property remain after
paying the partnership debts, such surplus shall be distributed
among the individual partners, general or limited, or added to
the estates of the general partners, as the case may be, in the
proportion of their respective interests in the partnership and in
the order of distribution provided by the laws of the State ap-
plicable thereto.
The occasions when a surplus materialized to be disposed of arose so
seldom that one encounters few instances of application of the sentence
and little discussion of the procedure or problems that its application
might conceivably have engendered.
Distribution of a surplus is not likely to be either so rare or simple in
tion, legislative history appearing elsewhere indicates that an agreement to share
liabilities should prevail over an agreement to share profits throughout title 11.
This is particularly important in the context of co-debtors who are partners.
124 CONG. REC. 32398, 33998 (1978). The legislative history "appearing elsewhere"
presumably includes statements that relate to § 723(d) and § 1301(c)(1). The House Report's
preference-for the apportionment of liabilities rather than the apportionment of profits in
connection with § 723(d) is referred to in the text accompanying note 145 infra. The
legislative history relating to § 1301(c)(1) includes this statement:
As with other sections in Title 11, the standard of receiving consideration is a
general rule, but where two co-debtors have agreed to share liabilities in a dif-
ferent manner than profits it is the individual who does not ultimately bear the
liability that is protected by the stay under section 1301.
124 CONG. REc. 32409 (Sept. 28, 1978) (Congressman Edwards' statement); 124 CONG. REC.
34009 (Oct. 5, 1978) (Senator DeConcini's statement).
The 15th edition of Collier does not attempt to explain or elaborate any of these ex-
cerpts from the legislative history quoted in this note, and it seems appropriate here to
leave them at rest.
"s See House REPORT, supra note 12, at 199, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6160.
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a partnership case under the Bankruptcy Code. The possibilities are only
partially recognized in section 723(d):
If the aggregate that the trustee recovers from the estates
of general partners under subsection (c) of this section is greater
than any deficiency not recovered under subsection (b) of this
section, the court, after notice and a hearing, shall determine an
equitable distribution of the surplus so recovered, and the
trustee shall distribute such surplus to the estates of the general
partners in such partnership according to such determination.
Section 723(d) only partially deals with the problem of disposition of a
surplus because it ignores the possibility of a surplus when the partner-
ship trustee recovers nothing under section 723(b), when he recovers
nothing under section 723(c), and when he recovers nothing under either
subsection. The statutory solution prescribed for the situation that is
identified in section 723(d) is so general and so unexceptionable,
however, that a court would be hard put to justify following any course
other than that set out in the statute in disposing of a surplus generated
by any concatenation of circumstances.
A surplus in the partnership estate may materialize without any
recovery under either section 723(b) or 723(c) simply as a result of
diligent collection of the property of the partnership, including
recoveries on choses in action belonging to the debtor"'7 and avoidance of
preferential, fraudulent, and otherwise voidable transfers. It is to be
noted that a petition may be filed by a partnership without regard to its
financial condition, and an involuntary petition may be filed against it
without alleging or proving insolvency or even inability to pay its debts
as they mature." It is thus entirely plausible for a partnership estate to
yield a surplus without the necessity for drawing on any general part-
ner's estate.
A surplus is more likely to be generated if the partnership trustee
pursues the remedies provided by section 723(b). The drafters may have
contemplated a single joint action for the deficiency of partnership pro-
perty to meet partnership debts against all of the general partners who
are not debtors in cases under the Bankruptcy Code, but there is no re-
quirement that he proceed in this way. Indeed, the statute seems
drafted on the contrary assumption that the trustee of the partnership
will sue each general partner severally for the full amount of the defi-
'" The property of a partnership includes the right to collect unpaid contributions from
limited partners.
' None of the grounds for an involuntary petition includes a financial condition of the
debtor as an element. See Kennedy, supra note 26, at 1008-14. Financial stringency is likely
to accompany each of the grounds specified in § 303(h), but for reasons indicated in the text,
entry of an order for relief on an involuntary petition does not preclude the possibility that
a surplus may be produced by a successful administration of the partnership estate.
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ciency, in the same way that a partnership creditor may sue for the full
amount of its claim against each partner severally under some state
laws.139 Whether the trustee obtains a joint or several judgment against
two or more general partners, the bankruptcy court may limit the ag-
gregate recovery from the partner to the amount of the deficiency. Until
the time for filing claims has run out 4 ' and disputes regarding the
amount and validity of the claims have been resolved,"" however, the
amount of the deficiency cannot actually be determined until the ad-
ministration of the estate has proceeded to the point when the case is
ready to be closed.
Although there is a greater likelihood that unanticipated costs of ad-
ministration and the reconsideration of claims will render recoveries ob-
tained pursuant to section 723(b) inadequate rather than excessive,
discovery of partnership property or recovery on partnership causes of
action may convert a deficiency into a surplus. The statutory direction of
section 723(c) for an equitable distribution to be determined and followed
is surely appropriate and applicable in such a situation.
If all the general partners as well as the partnership are debtors
under the Bankruptcy Code, the partnership trustee's automatic right to
share pari passu with separate creditors in each partner's estate, along
with the partnership creditors' exclusive right to share in the distribu-
tion of the partnership estate, creates a greater likelihood that a surplus
will result than in the situation dealt with by section 723(d)."' Again,
however, it is difficult to fashion a more appropriate statutory solution
than that set out in the last clause of section 723(d), namely, an equitable
distribution to the estates of the general partners.
While an equitable distribution cannot be questioned as the ideal ob-
jective in the abstract, what is equitable in particular circumstances is
'- See J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, supra note 6, at 335 n.54; F. MECHEM, supra note 4, at
273; Campbell, Partnership Obligations and Their Enforcement, 32 CHL-KENT L. REV. 127,
129-31 (1954); Hutchison, Enforceability of Iowa Creditors'Judgments Against Partnership
and Partners'Assets, 44 IowA L. REv. 643, 645, 649-50, 664-74 (1959).
"I Under FED. R. BANKR. P. 302(e), which remains in effect under § 405(d) of the
Bankruptcy Code until superseded by rules promulgated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2075
(Supp. 11 1979), the time for filing of claims runs for six months after the first date for the
first meeting of creditors. The time may be extended for governmental units and certain
other persons. The proposed Bankruptcy Rules that have been submitted for consideration
and promulgation by the Supreme Court prescribes a 90-day period following the first date
for the first meeting of creditors. See PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED NEw BANKRUPTCY
RULES AND OFFICIAL FORMS, Rule 3002(c) (1982).
"I It is to be noted that contingent, unliquidated, and disputed claims are allowable
without respect to the difficulties of liquidating them. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at
180, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6141. The delay that may be entailed by the process
of determining the amount of any claim is no longer a basis for disallowance. See § 502(b)(1).
" If all the partners are debtors in cases under the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee of
the partnership as the representative of all the partnership creditors will receive a dividend
on their aggregate claim against each of the several partners' estates, even though there
may be no deficiency in the partnership estate to meet partnership obligations.
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likely to be quite controversial. The source of the surplus is of course a
highly relevant factor, but timing may be important or at least a basis
for conflicting claims. Thus, suppose that a partner makes a substantial
advance to a general partnership shortly before a petition is filed by or
against the partnership. If the advance is made as a loan, the partner is
entitled to a repayment of the loan in full before any surplus can be
found to exist."' On the other hand, if the advance is categorized as a
contribution to the capital of the firm, it competes in the distribution of
any surplus with contributions of other partners, whether made both
before or after .the filing of the petition."'
The House Report that accompanied the bill that became the
Bankruptcy Code contained an elaborate discussion of the proper solu-
tion for disposing of a surplus. The Report stated at the outset of the
discussion that an equitable distribution should recognize the respon-
sibility of the partners for partnership liabilities under the partnership
agreement. "This measure is used in lieu of profit sharing percentages
because the redistributed surplus is directly mitigating a loss."'
4
Another principle embodied in the House Report's solution is that of pro-
tecting the estate of each partner from being required to distribute a
greater percentage to the partnership trustee than is distributed to the
separate creditors of the partner's estate. "' This principle is not made
explicit in the statute but was apparently regarded by the drafters of
the Report as a matter of fairness to the separate creditors, who are re-
quired by the statute to give up their traditional right to priority over
the partnership creditors in the distribution of the separate estate.
Without due concern for this principle a disposition of the surplus could
result in a discriminatory impact on the separate partner's estate and its
creditors. What was described as a "simple set of facts" was used in the
House Report as a basis for explanation of a solution meeting the
statutory command. " 7 A simpler situation is posed here to illustrate the
approach favored in the House Report.
A partnership P having liabilities of $100,000 has three partners, A,
B, and C, with separate liabilities of $200,000, $300,000, and $400,000
"' See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 40(b).
14d Id.
"' See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 201, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6161.
, See id. at 202, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6162-63.
', The hypothetical problem and its solution are set out in the House Report. See
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 201-03, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6161-64. The
problem involved the distribution of a surplus among the five members of a partnership, only
four of whom were debtors in cases under the Bankruptcy Code. The discussion was
predicated on a version of § 723(c) that has since been changed. The subsection as it read in
the original version of H.R. 8200 gave the trustee of a partnership debtor a claim that in-
cluded the administrative expenses of the partnership estate. See HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 12, at 200, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6161. As pointed out in text accompany-
ing note 80 supra, § 723(c) as enacted restricts the partnership trustee's automatic claim to
the allowed claim of creditors of the estate, exclusive of administrative expense claims.
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respectively. The partnership and partners are all debtors in cases
under the Bankruptcy Code. Administration of the partnership's prop-
erty produces $50,000 above administration expenses, and administra-
tion of the property of the partners yields the following amounts in ex-
cess of the administration expenses chargeable to each estate: A,
$100,000; B, $160,000; and C, $200,000. The partnership agreement
allocated partners' responsibility for partnership liabilities not covered
by partnership property according to the following percentages: A, 25%;
B, 25%; and C, 50%.
Under section 723(c) the following allowable claims and initial
distributions would be made:
Estate Partnership Separate Aggregate Estate Initial
Trustee's Claims Claims Distribution
Claim to Partnership
Trustee
A $100,000 $200,000 $ 300,000 $100,000 $ 33,300
B $100,000 $300,000 $ 400,000 $160,000 $ 40,000
C $100,000 $400,000 $ 500,000 $200,000 $ 40,000
Totals $100,000 $900,000 $1,200,000 $460,000 $113,300
Addition of the amounts initially distributable from the three part-
ners' estates to the partnership trustee sh(ws *a sum of $113,300,
whereas. the aggregate of the partnership creditors' claims is only
$100,000. The $50,000 obtained from the partnership property would
reduce the amount required and allowed to be distributed from the part-
ners' estates to the partnership trustee to $50,000. There would thus be
a surplus of $63,300 to be distributed pursuant to section 723(d) to the
partners. A, although responsible for only 25% of the partnership debts,
has contributed 33.3% of the partnership trustee's claim to the initial
distribution; B, likewise responsible for 25% of the partnership debts,
has contributed 400/0 of the partnership trustee's claim to the original
distribution; and C, although liable for half of the partnership debts, has
contributed only 400/o of the partnership trustee's claim to the initial
distribution. It would be manifestly unfair to the creditors of A and B to
allocate 50% of the surplus of $63,300 to C. On the other hand, it would
be unfair to the separate creditors of C, who receive only 400/0 of their
claims, to require any increase in the distribution from their debtor's
estate to the creditors of the partnership. The statute does not permit
the reduction of the percentage of distribution to the partnership
trustee out of A's and B's estates, and the separate creditors of A and B
are in no position to complain of a distribution of their respective deb-
tors' estates that treats them and the partnership trustee in exactly the
same way.
The solution proposed by the House Report would attempt to do
equity among the creditors of the three partners by adjusting the
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distribution of the surplus. On the initial distribution, C's estate had con-
tributed a percentage of the partnership trustee's claim that was 100/o
less than its 500/o share of the intrapartnership liability. This deficiency
had to be picked up by A's and B's estates, which were equally responsi-
ble for 25/o of the partnership's debts. Redistribution of the percentages
resulted in an assignment of an intrapartnership liability of 30/o each to
A and B, leaving C's portion at 40/o. Application of these percentages to
the $50,000 required from the partners' estates produced the following
allocations: A - $15,000; B- $15,000; and C- $20,000. When these alloca-
tions are subtracted from the initial distribution set out in the table
above, the surplus of $63,300 is distributed as follows: A-$18,300;
B-$25,000; and C-$20,000.'48
Notwithstanding the elaboration of a solution predicated on the
several partners' liabilities for the partnership debts rather than their
several shares in partnership profits, the House and the Senate Reports
both summarized the effect of section 723(d) as follows:
The determination will be based on factors such as the relative
liability of each of the general partners under the partnership
agreement and the relative rights of each of the general partners
in the profits of the enterprise under the partnership
agreement.4
", For the calculations used in reaching the results discussed in the text, see the Ap-
pendix.
" See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 381, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6337;
SEN. REPORT, supra note 12, at 95-96, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5881-82. It is to be
noted that the excerpt from the House Report quoted in the text is separated by nearly 200





Chart Showing Distribution of Partnership Surplus
Partner
A B C Total










7. 6 x money used
($50,000)










30 30 40 100%
$15,000 $15,000 $20,000
$33,300 $40,000 $40,000 $113,300
$18,300 $25,000 $20,000 $ 63,300
The above table is comparable to that set out in the House Report.'50
The table and problem in the House Report are more elaborate, not only
in that more partners are involved but one of them is not a debtor under
the Bankruptcy Code and two additional recomputations of interpartner-
ship liability are necessary to effect reallocation among the partners
whose estates contributed more to the payment of the partnership
trustee than was required by their original agreement.
Line one of the table represents each partner's liability under the
partnership agreement. If any of the partners was not a debtor in an in-
dividual case under the Bankruptcy Code, the nondebtor partner's share
would have to be reallocated to the debtor partners on a proportional
basis. In the House Report, this is called the recomputed intrapartner-
ship liability. 5 ' In the illustrative case set out in the text, there is no
need for such recomputation since all partners are debtors.
Line two sets out the original percentage distribution of each part-
ner's estate to all claim holders. Thus the partnership estate gets the in-
dicated percentage of the aggregate of all partnership creditors' claims
($100,000) from each partner.
Line three gives the difference between the percentage in line two
-' See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 202, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6163.
151 See id.
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and the percentage the partner is obligated to pay by agreement. Where
the number is negative, the partner is paying more in the original
distribution than his contract share, though he is not paying more at this
stage than he is paying to his separate creditors. If the number is
positive (as in the case of partner C), the partner cannot pay his full con-
tract share without prejudicing his separate creditors. Consequently,
partner C's share will be set at the line two percentage, and the other
partners must allocate the excess payment.
Line four sets out the percentage allocation of the unmet need (the
positive number of 10%) in line three. Line four will always sum to 100
because 100% of the unmet distribution must be allocated. The figures
on this line are the percentages of the combined liabilities of A and B
allocable each to A and B and are obtained simply by dividing the
percentage allocable to each (25% as to A and 25% as to B) by the total
of their combined liabilities (50%). C does not enter into the equation
because it is C's excess liability that is being allocated.
The figures in line five represent the additional percentage of lia-
bility for the partnership claims that A and B must meet because of the
equitable ceiling put on C. This allocation is obtained by multiplying the
positive number in line three by the allocative shares in line four.
Line six represents the new partnership distribution. It is obtained
by adding line five to the lower of line one or two for each partner. It is
called a test distribution in the House Report because we are not yet
sure if these shares are equitable until we compare them with the
equitable ceilings in line two. The House Report contains an additional
line seven which represents the figures of line six minus line two for
each partner. In the case at hand, this line would appear:
7. Difference (6-2) - 3.3 - 10 0
As long as there are no positive values in this line, there is no ine-
quitable effect on any partner's individual creditors and consequently no
need to allocate again. Because of the convenience of the example
figures, only one allocation (or 'iteration') is necessary. The House
Report example requires three allocation steps.
Line seven in the table represents the share each partner must bear
of the actual unpaid partnership claims in dollars. These figures are ob-
tained by multiplying the final line six shares by the amount of partner-
ship claims required to be paid after application of the partnership prop-
erty.
Line eight merely sets out the amounts the partnership trustee
received from each partner's estate as a general creditor as a result of
the original distribution.
Line nine gives the amounts each partner will receive from the
surplus of $63,300. It is obtained by subtracting line seven (amount need-




To meet fully the equitable goals in the House Report, this entire
process should be completed again until partner C is left without a
returned surplus. At the completion of the above process, all three part-
ners are given a returned surplus. Logically, these assets will go to in-
crease the percentage pay-out of the separate partnership creditors.
This is recorded as a general increase in the line two figures. On the next
pass through the above process, the line two figures will be larger, the
line three positive figure will be smaller, and the line six figures will be
smaller for A and B and larger for C. Consequently, the line seven
figures will be smaller for A and B and larger for C than in the first ap-
plication. Ultimately, the line nine figure for C will equal 0.
Repeated applications of the iteration process comports with the
House Report mandate not to prejudice the individual creditors of A and
B. At the end of the first application, the individual creditors of A and B
will get a larger distribution because of the returned surplus, but so will
C's creditors. Why should C's creditors benefit because C could not
satisfy his contract share and A and B had to step in? Repeated applica-
tions of this process will make C bear more of the reallocation through
his surplus and keep A and B closer to their 250/0 shares.
In conclusion, additional applications of the House Report process
are needed to achieve the twin goals of equitable distribution of surplus
and avoidance of prejudice to individual partner creditors. Although a
standard computer program could be created to perform these pro-
cesses, it may be beyond the resources, if not the ken, of those courts
which must handle the rare case of a surplus. Consequently, the same
result may be approximated in the above example by allocating C's
$20,000 surplus to A and B in a 3 to 4 ratio.
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